
A Thesis Submitted to the Committee on Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Arts and Science

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History M.A. Graduate Program
September, 2016
ABSTRACT


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This thesis provides an analysis of the Carnegie Commission’s report on the causes and consequences of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). Shortly after the closing of hostilities, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace appointed an international Commission of Inquiry to collect evidence of atrocities from the sites of war. The thesis analyzes the arguments expressed in the Commission’s report as an example of European and American attitudes towards the Balkans. The concept of Balkanism provides a theoretical framework according to which the Commissioners’ views are contextualized within the existing stereotypes of the region. Based on the correspondence available in the archives of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the memoirs and biographies of the various members of the Commission, and the information published in periodicals, this work also examines the justifications for the appointment of the Commission, the circumstances related to the investigation of atrocities and the reaction of Balkan governments to the report.

Keywords: Carnegie Report, Carnegie Commission, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Balkan Wars, Balkanism.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Professor Olga Andriewsky, for her guidance and continuous support throughout my graduate studies. Professor Andriewsky inspired me to research this topic and she helped me tremendously in driving my project to completion. The writing of this thesis also would not have been possible without the help from Professor Finis Dunaway and Professor Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez. Their insightful suggestions and constructive criticisms have contributed greatly to quality of this project. A special thanks goes to the History M.A. Program at Trent University for funding my trip to the archives of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The bursary I received from the Program has been incredibly useful for the collection of material which was essential for my thesis. I wish to thank Jennifer Comins at the Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Columbia University for helping me navigate through the archives of the Carnegie Endowment. I would also like to thank the Director of the History M.A. Program at Trent, Professor Jennine Hurl-Eamon, for inspiring me and teaching me how to become a better scholar. Finally, my academic journey would have been impossible without the love and support of my partner Brian and my parents, Nelly and Nikolai.
Table of Contents

Abstract ii

Acknowledgements iii

Table of Contents iv

Introduction 1-21

Chapter I-History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 22-55

Chapter II-The Appointment of the Carnegie Commission 56-88

Chapter III-The Carnegie Commission’s Perspective on the Balkan Wars 89-121

Conclusion 122-139

Bibliography 140-149
Introduction

The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 caught the attention of the “civilized world” with news of unprecedented atrocities.\(^1\) Driven by the ambition to eliminate Ottoman influence and establish homogeneous nation-states, the “powder keg” of Europe exploded in a major confrontation which involved virtually every country on the peninsula. According to the reports released in European and American newspapers, the Balkan Wars were the most violent conflict of modern times. To some contemporary observers, the massacres perpetrated by the Balkan armies were a sign of primitivism. As civilians became both the victims and perpetrators of terror, the battlefields and the noncombatant zones became virtually indistinguishable. In addition, military groups which were led by brigands organized systematic persecution of enemy populations. Due to the magnitude and severity of the conflicts, the Balkan Wars received widespread coverage in the press. Journalists from Russia, Great Britain, Ireland, the United States and Germany descended on the Balkan capitals to collect first-hand evidence about the “atrocities.”\(^2\)

The leaders of the Balkan governments contributed to the story by issuing official statements regarding the origins of the conflicts. In the summer of 1913, *The New York Times* published dispatches by King Constantine I of Greece and Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria which described events related to the outbreak of the Second Balkan War.\(^3\) The

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mutual accusations of the Balkan rulers resulted in the publication of a series of contradictory and deliberately exaggerated reports. As each side denied responsibility for the atrocities, it became increasingly difficult to determine the veracity of the statements which circulated in the press. The inconsistency of information was observed by Nicholas Murray Butler, director of the Division of Intercourse and Education at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Founded in 1910 by the business magnate Andrew Carnegie, the Endowment quickly emerged as one of the most powerful pacifist organizations which promoted arbitration as a substitute for war. The division under Butler’s leadership aimed specifically at the improvement of international relations through cultural and diplomatic exchange. He appointed an international commission of inquiry to the sites of war whose duty was to ascertain responsibility for the crimes committed during the Balkan Wars. Representatives from Great Britain, France, the United States, Russia, Austria and Germany collected first-hand evidence from government officials, soldiers and civilians. Their findings were published in an extensive report which appeared in the summer of 1914, just one month prior to the outbreak of World War I.

**Historiography of the Carnegie Report**

Due to the abundance of first-hand evidence which was collected by the Commission, historians have long valued the Carnegie Report as a faithful depiction of the Balkan Wars. Based on the events described in the document, some scholars have identified the conflict as a prelude to World War I. According to Richard C. Hall, the Balkan Wars transformed European warfare by introducing new military concepts, such
as the targeting of civilian populations and mass mobilization. Hall quotes population and casualty statistics from the Report, as well as information related to the actions of the Balkan armies and the progress of peace negotiations. The Carnegie Report has also been used as a source of evidence for the history of Balkan nationalism. Fatme Myuhtar-May demonstrates that the persecution of Bulgarian Muslims during the twentieth century was a precondition for the establishment of the Bulgarian nation-state. Her research into the forced Christianization of Pomaks during the First Balkan War is based in part on the testimony of Macedonian Muslims which is featured in the appendix of the Report. Although Myuhtar-May dismisses the condescending attitude of the Commission towards the Balkan people as “politically incorrect,” she acknowledges the efforts to document the existence of a historic event which, due to lack of written sources, has received limited attention from scholars.

Historian Mark Mazower has similarly observed that the process of building the nation-state in the Balkans involved the violent persecution of minority populations. The expulsion or voluntary exchange of various ethnic groups, as well as the policies of cultural and religious assimilation, were practiced by all Balkan nations between 1912 and 1922. According to Mazower, the Carnegie Report confirms that during the Balkan Wars, both Christians and Muslims became perpetrators and targets of violence. The evidence presented by the Commission suggests that the atrocities which Greeks, Serbians and Bulgarians inflicted upon each other were just as severe as the reprisals.

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5 Ibid., 138.
against their former Ottoman oppressors. Historian Philip Ther has also discussed the exodus of populations from the Balkans. Ther contextualizes the Balkan Wars within the broader history of European nationalism. He uses evidence from the Carnegie Report to demonstrate the involvement of ecclesiastical leaders in the policy of cultural assimilation. In addition to organizing forced religious conversions, Greek and Bulgarian clergy spread nationalist propaganda and participated in acts of violence. According to Ther, the animosity between Christians shows that the conflict in the Balkans was “ethno-national,” rather than religious.

Historian Ivo Banac has also analyzed the conflict between Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs during the Second Balkan War. His research into the origins of the national question in Yugoslavia devotes considerable attention to the competing aims of the Balkan nations in Macedonia. The Carnegie Report provides useful information about the events which occurred while the province was under Greek and Serbian occupation. In order to legitimize their claims to ethnic and cultural belonging, the authorities organized systematic persecution against Bulgarian bishops and schoolmasters, while the peasant population was forced to denounce its nationality. Banac also acknowledges the efforts of the Commission to document the violent suppression of the Albanian revolt by Serbian authorities in 1913. Historian Misha Glenny has similarly discussed the Carnegie Report’s evidence of the conflict between Greeks and Bulgarians. The violent imagery in Greek propaganda posters, which are published in the Report, illustrates the “hysteria”

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which animated the soldiers. According to Glenny, the Report also suggests that the
to the Balkan armies was based on vengeance. Upon conquering
Thrace, Bulgarian soldiers destroyed the symbols of Islam, while the defeated Ottomans
outraged Bulgarian women and massacred children. Historian Paul Mojzes argues that
the repressive policies of Balkan civil and military authorities represent a form of
violence. Although the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 have been overshadowed by other
events from the twentieth century, such as the Armenian genocide, the attempts to wipe
out entire populations deserve greater recognition by scholars. Mojzes’ arguments are
based primarily on the evidence published in the Carnegie Report.

Other scholars have contextualized the Balkan inquiry within the history of
international relations. Dorothy Jones’ book Toward a Just World examines the
development of international law during the twentieth century. The Hague Conferences
of 1899 and 1907 inspired the movement for the popularization of arbitration treaties as a
substitute for war. Jones evaluates the effectiveness of three commissions of inquiry,
which were organized according to the principles of the Hague Conventions, as methods
for promoting permanent peace. Although her discussion of the Carnegie Report itself is
limited, she provides a thorough analysis of the obstacles which prevented the Balkan
Commission from carrying out the inquiry, such as the accusations of partiality against
the English and Russian commissioners. Jones also points out that, as a self-appointed
 guardian of justice and peace, the Carnegie Commission lacked the official backing of an
international organization, such as the Red Cross or the League of Nations, and had to

Books, 1999), 237, 247.
11 Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century (Plymouth:
rely on its reputation for success. According to Jones, after the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919, there was some improvement in the status of international commissions. In 1925, an inquiry organized by the League successfully averted a war between Bulgaria and Greece, but the Lytton Commission of 1933 failed to prevent the annexation of Manchuria by Japan.\(^\text{12}\)

Historian Nadine Akhund also uses a comparative approach to her analysis of the Carnegie Report. She examines the differences and similarities between the 1913 Carnegie Commission and the 1921 League of Nations inquiry into the status of Albania. The two investigations represent a new form of international intervention which emerged after the Hague Conferences. In the early twentieth century, collective diplomacy gradually replaced military force as a method for maintaining the balance of power in Europe. Despite the commissioners’ idealistic belief that they could promote peace in the Balkans, the Carnegie Report failed to make an impact on public opinion. The 1921 Commission was more successful than its predecessor due to the existence of the League of Nations as an international organization which recognized its findings and enforced its recommendations.\(^\text{13}\)

Frances Trix argues that the main reason for the failure of the Carnegie Report to fulfill its objective was the delay in its publication. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 overshadowed the Balkan Wars and the Commission’s work thus passed into oblivion.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{12}\) Dorothy Jones, *Toward a Just World*, 58-75.


Ivan Ilchev has focused exclusively on the reaction of the Bulgarian government to the Carnegie Report. The findings of the Commission were celebrated as an attempt to exonerate the country from the crimes which the foreign press ascribed to it during the Second Balkan War. Ilchev highlights the efforts of Greek and Serbian propaganda to tarnish Bulgaria’s reputation by spreading false rumours about the atrocities which were perpetrated by the army. Due to the severe economic effects of the war, the Bulgarian government was unable to launch a propaganda campaign of its own which would counter the accusations. In addition, foreign correspondents who visited the country were restricted by censorship and were unable to provide accurate reports of the conflict. Ilchev argues that the purpose of the Carnegie Commission was to improve Bulgaria’s international standing. The Report exposed the exaggerations of the Greek and Serbian governments and showed that the Bulgarian reprisals were provoked by enemy attacks. Although Ilchev provides a detailed analysis of the reception of the Carnegie Report in the Balkans, he overemphasizes the overall success of the Commission and does not attempt to question its objectivity.15

Theoretical Framework

Although these historians have provided a narrative of the Report and discussed the circumstances surrounding the investigation of atrocities and the reaction of the Balkan governments, no attempt has been made to analyze the background of the Carnegie Commission and the social and political trends which influenced the Report and its analysis. While it is true that pacifism and a humanitarian concern for the suffering of

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civilians during the conflicts motivated the inquiry, this explanation is too simplistic and does not offer an understanding of the attitudes of European and American writers towards the Balkan people, their culture and history. This thesis will analyze the Carnegie Report as an example of Balkanism. Coined in 1994 by historian Maria Todorova, Balkanism reflects the predominantly negative discourse on the Balkans which emerged in Europe during the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{16} Like Edward Said’s Orientalism, Balkanism is a discourse which denotes otherness. It implies a similar dichotomy between a dominant, powerful, and civilized West and a barbaric, subordinate and chaotic East. Balkanism also revolves around discussions of cultural and material progress. Foreign representations of the Balkans frequently juxtapose the region’s backwardness with the highly advanced cultures of the West. As a result of these similarities, some historians have adapted the Orientalist framework to the Balkan context. However, Todorova suggests that, for a number of reasons, the relationship between the Balkans and the West forms part of a separate discourse. She contrasts the intangible nature of the Orient with the historical and geographic concreteness of the Balkans. While the Orient is an abstract concept which does not correspond to a stable reality, the term ‘Balkans,’ as a designation, refers to a specific region which has a clearly defined historical existence. According to Todorova, Balkan history can be divided into two main periods. While the Byzantine and Ottoman eras were both crucial for shaping the image of the Balkans, the Ottoman legacy is largely responsible for the stereotypes which are currently attached to the region.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{17} Todorova, \textit{Imagining the Balkans}, 11-13.
Another major distinction between the Balkans and the Orient is the stereotypes which the two regions evoke in the European imagination. Unlike the Balkans, the Orient has often been subject to romanticization and idealization. Foreign representations emphasize the wealth, opulence and mysticism of the East. Its exotic features, such as harems, baths and smoking rooms, offer an escape from the prosaic world of the rapidly industrializing West. The Orientalist discourse also ascribes a feminine identity to the East. The Orient’s sensual, erotic and irrational nature provides a justification for its subordination by the masculine, rational West. By contrast, the image of the Balkans stands for backwardness and poverty and offers little opportunity for escapist fantasies. While they share some similarities with the Orient, such as romantic associations with a bygone era, the Balkans are rarely idealized and usually evoke negative representations by foreigners. The lack of European civilization in the Balkans is depicted as the result of cultural and economic deficiency and rarely produces fascination with the region’s “exoticism” and “mystique.” While within the “civilized world” masculinity is associated with intellectual thought and reason, self-restraint over primal instincts and passions, and ability to administer law and government, Balkan maleness corresponds to the crude physical strength and belligerent instincts which are characteristic of primitive cultures. In the early twentieth century, Macedonian bandits became the epitome of the region’s military and political instability and frequently evoked fears of terrorism. On the other hand, Balkan women were rarely associated with physical beauty and sexuality. In some cases, like that of the Macedonian revolutionary leader Tsveta Boyova, they were celebrated for their masculine qualities.18

18 Ibid., 13-15.
Todorova further maintains that Orientalism cannot be applied to the Balkans because the region did not experience European colonialism. Although the Great Powers formed spheres of influence, their relationship with the countries of South-East Europe is different from the pattern which exists in the Middle and Far East. In addition, since Orientalism concerns Europe’s relationship with countries which are geographically located outside the continent, it does not fit into the Balkan context, despite the region’s marginal status. While Orientalism presents East and West as two complete opposites, in the Balkanist discourse, the East represents a variant of the West, or, as Todorova suggests, an “incomplete self.” Foreign writers emphasize the transitionary status of the Balkans, often using the metaphor of a bridge to emphasize their cultural ambiguity. The Balkans share some characteristics with the rest of Europe, but, at the same time, they have distinct features which connect them with the East. For example, Balkan religion is treated as a deviation from Western European Catholicism. Although Orthodox Christianity is not considered a transition to Islam, it is a symbol of political rivalry and represents the unbridgeable cultural gap between Eastern and Western Europe. The Balkans’ political status also implies ambiguity. The legacy of Ottoman imperialism and the lack of traditions in self-government create a gulf with the “civilized world.” In terms of their racial characteristics, Balkan people represent a bridge between barbarity and civilization. According to early twentieth-century taxonomic observations, in South-East Europe, various ethnicities intermixed, producing a type which was a blend between the Oriental and European races and which carried with it predominantly negative characteristics. Balkan racial mixture was identified with impurity and had low aesthetic value. Despite their white skin, Slavic women were described as having negroid features,
such as thick lips and flat, wide noses, which implied low intellect and thus placed them on the bottom of the referential scale.¹⁹

The stereotype of the Balkans as barbaric, primitive and unable to conform to “civilized” standards of international behaviour emerged during the first two decades of the twentieth century. As a result of the ongoing political and social instability in South-East Europe, the region acquired an increasingly negative image in the “civilized world.” In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars and World War I, “balkanization” emerged as a pejorative term which indicates the Great Powers’ displeasure with the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire into small, belligerent nation-states.²⁰ The territorial changes in the Balkans threatened the European balance of power and influenced the tendency to view the newly emerged countries as the continent’s “powder keg.” The military confrontations also led to the emergence of a collective image of the Balkans as backward and prone to violence. The Carnegie Report confirms the existence of this stereotype. The members of the Commission viewed the Balkan countries in a monolithic fashion, arguing that the tendency towards extreme violence was an inherent characteristic of the “Balkan mentality.” The authors of the Report also ascribed a collective verdict for the “barbarities” and suggested that all belligerents were equally responsible for violating European moral standards. However, as Todorova suggests, prior to the twentieth century, foreign perspectives on the Balkans were more nuanced.²¹

The region’s militancy and backwardness were seen as consequences of Ottoman tyranny and were, therefore, excused and tolerated. In addition, intellectual movements, like

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¹⁹ Ibid., 15-20; 123-125.
²⁰ Ibid., 32.
²¹ Ibid., 89-116.
Philhellenism and Slavophilism, influenced European sympathy for the nationalistic movements of Greeks and South-Slavs. Although foreigners expressed contempt for Balkan primitivism, this attitude was influenced by aristocratic and class prejudice against the Christian peasantry in the Ottoman Empire, rather than by scientific explanations about racial and cultural backwardness.

A break occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century due to the growth of racism and evolutionism. Although Balkan people were subject to the laws of evolution, their ascendance into civilization was limited by their biological features. Racial impurity not only suggested unappealing features, but it was also considered a regression from the idealized Germanic and Anglo-Saxon types who occupied the highest ranks of taxonomic categorizations. Ethnic heterogeneity, particularly in the context of the nation-state, was also considered a precursor to violence due to the inability of hostile groups to coexist. Some evidence suggests that the Balkan races were seen as decadent and digressing into a lower state of civilization. According to the American journalist Edward Smith, who visited the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, Balkan mountaineers resembled the vanishing Cherokee and Choctaw races in terms of their physical features, primitive culture and inability to adapt to modern civilization. By comparing the Balkans to Indian territory in the United States, Smith suggested the possibility of the region’s assimilation by a more powerful and advanced civilization. Evolutionism also influenced the perspective of the Carnegie Commission on Balkan violence. The actions of the belligerents were interpreted as a consequence of their low cultural and economic status. As the Commission suggests, compared to the countries which formed part of the

22 Ibid., 107; 123-108.
“civilized world,” the Balkans were lagging behind in their social, political and industrial development. According to the Report, the Balkan Wars were also provoked by “racial hatreds” and struggle for survival between primitive competing groups.

Most historians who have discussed the Balkanist discourse have focused on cultural and political representations from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Several scholars have analyzed British perspectives on the Balkans. According to Todorova, in the late nineteenth century, fears of Russian expansionism influenced the hostility of conservative politicians towards the nationalist movements in South-East Europe. The preservation of the Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity was strategic for maintaining British political and commercial hegemony. Todorova suggests that the writings of many contemporary travellers expressed an elitist attitude which was consistent with the official British policy towards the Balkans. Members of the upper class and the aristocracy showed sympathy for the Ottoman elites, while Christian peasants were often treated with disdain. Englishmen who visited Greece as part of the Grand Tour failed to identify themselves with the local people. The Greeks seemed slovenly and ignorant and were far removed from the idealized image which was established in classical literature. British Philhellenism declined significantly after the wars of liberation because, as recent events demonstrated, the Greeks were incapable of self-government. By contrast, the Ottomans resembled Europeans more closely than the Balkan Christians, since they embodied familiar characteristics, such as hospitality and sophistication.23

23 Ibid., 92-96.
Some historians, including Maria Todorova, James Perkins and Eugene Michail, have suggested that, unlike the Conservatives, British Liberals were sympathetic to the idea of Balkan independence. This attitude was part of a general concern for the plight of “oppressed peoples,” such as the Egyptians, the Indians and the Persians. Emancipation from foreign rule was considered a necessary precondition for cultural and material progress. By abolishing Ottoman power from the Balkans, the various people who inhabited the region could finally be brought into civilization. But the solution of the Eastern Question did not necessarily involve the establishment of nation-states. Autonomy and Home Rule, which was identical to the system proposed for the administration of Ireland, were advocated as viable alternatives to nationalism. On the one hand, this attitude reflected the Liberals’ support for political movements which aimed at institutional freedom, civil rights, and self-government. Although Anglo-Saxon superiority justified British imperialism, all nationalities were capable of achieving the same level of progress and were thus worthy of pursuing their aims.24 On the other hand, the concern for the suffering of Balkan Christians was analogous with the remorse which Liberals felt for the existence of domestic problems, such as the poverty of the working class and the Irish Question.25 As the politician William Gladstone argued in 1876, British complacency towards Ottoman tyranny was partly responsible for the brutal suppression of the April Uprising in Bulgaria. He advocated intervention in order to solve the Eastern Question and liberate the oppressed nationalities.26

25 Ibid., 71-102; Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 100.
Todorova argues that American perspectives on the Balkans were also influenced by the necessity to promote civilization among the people of the region. Since the United States had limited political and diplomatic contact with the Ottoman Empire, travellers, missionaries, journalists and educators were primarily responsible for shaping the knowledge about the various nationalities of South-East Europe. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions organized major educational projects in the Balkans. In addition to the network of foreign schools, the Board also established the famous Robert College in Constantinople which was considered the most prestigious institution of higher education in the region.27 By contrast, *Imagining the Balkans* demonstrates that Russian attitudes towards South-East Europe were influenced by the desire of the ruling elites to eliminate Ottoman influence from the region. Intellectuals and politicians expressed almost universal solidarity with the emancipation movements of the Greeks and the South Slavs. In the late nineteenth century, Russian Slavophilism emerged as the equivalent of Western European Philhellenism. There was a tendency among intellectuals to view Bulgaria as the cradle of Slavic civilization which was reminiscent of the Western fascination with Ancient Greece. Russian foreign policy in the Balkans was characterized by a paternalistic concern for the plight of fellow Slavs which found expression in the works of many famous writers.28

Todorova further proposes that during the first decade of the twentieth century, the image of the Balkans as a turbulent region became more firmly established. Although Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia were free from Ottoman rule, the movement for the liberation of Macedonia contributed to further instability. In addition, the violent assassination of

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27 Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 105.
28 Ibid., 82-85.
the Serbian King Alexander Obernović and his wife Draga in 1903 exposed the absence of moral standards among the Balkan people. However, contemporary observers interpreted these events as a natural consequence of Ottoman rule, rather than a specific cultural trait. As historian Eugene Michail suggests, this view was universally accepted among British Liberals. The outrages which took place during the revolts and wars of liberation were justified as consequences of the struggle for political emancipation. By contrast, the crimes which Ottoman authorities committed against Christians were immediately condemned.29 The tendency to justify Balkan violence persisted during the outbreak of the First Balkan War in 1912. The military accomplishments of the Balkan League were celebrated as an independent effort against Ottoman tyranny. The international public showed leniency towards the atrocities of the Balkan armies, arguing that they were a “necessary evil” which would guarantee the social and political progress of the region. However, European perspectives on the origins of Balkan violence changed dramatically during the Second Balkan War. The massacres which took place during the “fratricidal” conflict surpassed the cruelties which Christian soldiers inflicted upon Muslims. The actions of the belligerents were no longer seen as a product of nationalism. As Michail and Todorova argue, the episodes of extreme violence were interpreted as a cultural characteristic which was deeply engrained in the Balkan psyche.30

Most historians who analyze the Balkanist discourse have focused on the representations which exist in fiction and travel literature from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These scholars demonstrate that the discovery of the Balkans as a

30 Ibid., 84; Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 118.
distinct cultural and geographic sphere within the Ottoman Empire coincided with the
process of constructing or “inventing” the identity of the region. David Norris examines
the establishment of the “Balkan myth” in the works of British journalists, travel writers
and poets. The images created by these authors represent a form of “cultural colonialism”
which has been appropriated by Western media and internalized by the Balkan states. The
same theme has also been discussed by Vesna Goldsworthy. She argues that English
fiction writers established the “imaginative colonization” of the Balkans, whereby the
region’s stereotypes were exploited in order to supply the literary and entertainment
industries.\(^3\) Andrew Hammond focuses exclusively on British and American travel
writing from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century to highlight the development of
Balkan representations during three distinct political eras.\(^3\) Finally, James Perkins
analyzes the significance of the Balkans for British politics, while Eugene Michail traces
the process of forming impressions of the peninsula through the interactions of
government leaders, scholars and journalists with the Balkan public.\(^3\)

The Carnegie Report is unique in terms of its genre and the perspective it
provides. It was intended as a scientific investigation into the causes and consequences of
the Balkan Wars which had no equivalent among contemporary pacifist literature. The
Commission was conceived as a panel of experts in the fields of history, politics,
economics and international law who were impartial to the existing conflict. The
arguments expressed in the Report were based on the analysis of witness testimony and

\(^3\) David Norris, *In the Wake of the Balkan Myth: Questions of Identity and Modernity* (London: Macmillan
\(^3\) Andrew Hammond, *The Debated Lands: British and American Representations of the Balkans* (Cardiff:
University of Wales Press, 2007).
\(^3\) Michail, *The British and the Balkans: Forming Images of Foreign Lands, 1900-1950*; Perkins, *British
Liberalism and the Balkans*. 
statistical data, rather than the personal observations of the authors. The Report is also exceptional in the sense that it combines the perspectives of Russian, Western European and American writers. While most historians have discussed the differences between foreign representations of the Balkans, this thesis will attempt to demonstrate the convergence between the attitudes of the authors of the Carnegie Report. The inquiry into the Balkan Wars was motivated in part by the desire to show the Great Powers were unanimously opposed to militarism. Despite the political and diplomatic crisis on the eve of World War I, the members of the Carnegie Commission attempted to convince the international public that the intellectual and political elites of Europe and the United States were committed to the preservation of peace. They juxtaposed the stereotype of the violent, barbaric and semi-colonial Balkans with the image of a morally, culturally and politically superior “civilized world.” As representatives of the Great Powers, the Commissioners felt entitled to condemn the Balkan massacres and expressed a paternalistic concern for the progress of less advanced nations.

Although historians have provided a brief context to the investigation of the Balkan Wars, no attempt has been made to study the politics of the Carnegie Report. In addition, the historiography of the Report lacks a thorough analysis of the circumstances related to the appointment of the Balkan inquiry, the reaction of the Balkan governments to the presence of the Commission, or the reception of the Report in Europe and the United States. This thesis will discuss in detail the history of the Carnegie Report, including the background of the Commission members and the motivations of Nicholas Butler for organizing the investigation. It will situate the Report within the context of the American peace movement, rather than the history of the Hague Conferences, thereby
providing a more narrow focus of the ideological influences which inspired contemporary pacifists. The thesis will also argue that the leaders of the Carnegie Endowment used the Report as an instrument for promoting political ideas. As the following chapters will show, international arbitration acquired significance among government leaders in the United States during the early twentieth century. In addition, the report reflects the ideas of European Liberals about the political organization and territorial settlement of the Balkans.

This thesis will further attempt to demonstrate that the Carnegie Report analyzes the Balkans from an evolutionary perspective. Although Todorova argues that the first studies related to the evolutionary progress of the countries of South-East Europe were written after World War I, the arguments presented by the Balkan Commission suggest that this scientific approach originated earlier. The authors of the Report contrasted the “immaturity,” “backwardness” and “primitivism” of the Balkan nations with the feats and accomplishments of the “civilized world.” They used terms such as “southern races” to refer to the belligerents, while the Balkan Wars were described as “racial hatreds” or “the conflict between the races.” The Carnegie Report is thus not only a document which promotes international arbitration, but also a discussion of Balkan civilization. The Commission pointed out that the lack of economic, cultural and material development in the former Ottoman provinces was primarily responsible for the outbreak of the conflicts. On the other hand, the Great Powers had achieved a level of progress to which the Balkan nations must aspire.

34 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 123-133.
Chapter Outline

The first chapter will contextualize the Carnegie Report within the history of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. An examination of the social and political trends which influenced the leaders of the American peace movement during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides a valuable insight into the ideas expressed in the Carnegie Report. The proceedings from the Lake Mohonk Conferences illustrate the growing significance of international arbitration in the decade leading up to the outbreak of World War I. The conferences were attended by the political and intellectual elite of the United States, including some of the future founders of the Carnegie Endowment. The public addresses, memoirs and biographies of Andrew Carnegie, Nicholas Butler and Elihu Root demonstrate that they advocated international arbitration as a method for promoting American expansionism. The leaders of the Endowment also shared a belief in Social Darwinism. Herbert Spencer’s theory of society’s transition from militancy to pacifism inspired their belief in the possibility to permanently abolish war. Spencer’s writings also influenced a sense of elitism which is reflected in the pages of the Report.

The second chapter will analyze the circumstances surrounding the appointment of commission members and the investigation of the Balkan Wars. The correspondence collected in the Carnegie Endowment’s archives demonstrates that Nicholas Butler played a key role in initiating the inquiry and selecting representatives. The Commission was organized according to Butler’s concept of the International Mind which reflects the belief that a small group of highly educated individuals from the “civilized world” should be in charge of conducting foreign affairs and directing public opinion. His decision to
seek publicity for the Report suggests that the motivation for organizing the inquiry was self-serving. The chapter further examines the background of the commissioners through their political memoirs and biographies. A detailed analysis of the political beliefs and activities of Miliukov and Brailsford provides an explanation for Serbia and Greece’s rejection of the Carnegie Commission. Although Butler hoped to convey a sense of impartiality, the appointment of the Commission was highly politicized and its overall success was limited.

The third chapter will examine in detail the ideas expressed in the Carnegie Report. The Commission discussed the extreme violence of the Balkan nations as a sign of primitivism. The Balkan Wars were highly destructive and aimed at the complete extermination of the enemy. The methods of warfare, the involvement of irregular soldiers, civil and religious authorities in the conflict, and the policies of cultural assimilation were seen as evidence of the cultural gap between Europe and the Balkans. The Commission interpreted the actions of the belligerents as a regression to ancient ways, rather than an indication of the changing nature of European warfare. At the same time, the Report emphasized the role of the “civilized world” as a guardian of international peace. The Great Powers, which have overcome their militant tendencies, had a duty to promote understanding among the Balkan nations and guide them towards reconciliation. Finally, the Conclusion will discuss the reception of the Carnegie Report by the Balkan governments and the reasons for its failure to influence international public opinion.
Chapter I: History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The Carnegie Report is illustrative of the ideological influences and political aspirations of contemporary pacifists. The inquiry into the Balkan Wars was motivated by the belief that, due to their cultural and economic superiority, the imperial powers were responsible for defining the standards of international conduct. In the first decade of the twentieth century, political leaders in Europe and the United States advocated arbitration as a “civilized” method of solving international disputes. Since the Great Powers had outgrown their militaristic tendencies, they had a duty to promote international understanding among underdeveloped nations. The inability of the Balkan countries to settle their differences in a peaceful manner was interpreted as a sign of primitivism. The members of the Carnegie Commission expressed a condescending attitude towards the belligerents, arguing that as representatives of the “civilized world,” they had the authority to condemn their brutality and make recommendations for the establishment of permanent peace. On the other hand, the publication of the Report coincided with the politicization of the peace movement in the United States. The growth of American imperialism in the late nineteenth century led to the popularization of international arbitration among government leaders, businessmen and international lawyers. Among the founders of the Carnegie Endowment, there were well-known political figures and advocates of imperialism, including Andrew Carnegie, Elihu Root and Nicholas Butler.

This chapter will contextualize the Report of the Balkan Commission within the history of the Carnegie Endowment. An examination of the ideological and political influences which led to the establishment of the organization provides a valuable insight
into the arguments presented by the authors of the Report. International arbitration was consistent with the logic of imperialism and became an important feature of the foreign policies of Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft. Andrew Carnegie’s strong ties to the Republican Party suggest that the Endowment promoted political ideas through its publications. More importantly, the advocates of international arbitration, including the leaders of the Carnegie Endowment, were heavily influenced by Social Darwinism. Scientific theories which linked the lack of economic development to militarism contributed to the emergence of the elitist attitude expressed by the authors of the Carnegie Report. The Commission emphasized cultural backwardness and lack of industrial development as the main factors responsible for the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. The Report also reflects the belief that intellectuals should be in charge of improving foreign relations. The Balkan Commission was conceived as a group of renowned international experts who represented the educated elite of their respective countries. Using examples from the history of the American peace movement, this chapter will discuss the evolution of pacifist ideas during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It will also examine the role of Andrew Carnegie in the peace movement, his relationship with the future leaders of the Endowment and the specific events which led to its establishment.

The Transforming Years: 1895-1910

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, pacifism in the United States was part of a broader movement for social reform which was based in New England. Organized primarily by religious groups, like the Society of Friends, the peace movement was nonpolitical and attracted a small number of conservative individuals who believed that contributing to the improvement of social conditions was a Christian duty. After the Civil War, the Boston-based American Peace Society emerged as the largest and most influential organization devoted to the popularization of antiwar propaganda. The society attracted supporters from various religiously inspired movements, including temperance, observance of the Sabbath, Indian rights and women’s suffrage. Boston’s wealthy elites, who had traditionally been involved in philanthropic organizations, were also well represented among the American Peace Society’s members. The ideas and attitudes of the peace movement were in many ways characteristic of the declining New England reform tradition. Like their predecessors, whose social activism was grounded in religious and ethical principles, late nineteenth-century pacifists relied on moral persuasion and an appeal to reason for accomplishing their goals. Instead of advocating a specific plan for the establishment of international peace, the leaders of the American Peace Society focused on exposing the horrors and injustices of war in their publications. Through the frequent use of religious imagery, the society’s official periodical demonstrated that armed conflicts were inconsistent with the teachings of Christianity and made an appeal to its readers to accept peace as God’s will.36

Due to its narrow agenda, the American Peace Society failed to attract any of the nation’s progressive thinkers or to acquire political influence. In 1892, the organization experienced a brief revival under the leadership of its new secretary Benjamin Trueblood. As a well-known Quaker scholar and missionary, Trueblood increased the society’s prestige and expanded its membership. His main contribution, however, was the adoption of international arbitration, a subject which had recently become relevant among European pacifists, as the organization’s official policy. Although Trueblood was able to transform the character of the American Peace Society and to bring it into line with its existing counterparts, financial difficulties prevented the organization from performing effective work. However, for a number of reasons, the final decade of the nineteenth century proved favourable to the growth of pacifism in the United States. One of the people who contributed to the popularization of international arbitration, and to the general transformation of the American peace movement during that time, was the Quaker businessman Albert K. Smiley. In 1895, Smiley hosted the first annual conference on international arbitration at his Lake Mohonk Hotel in Ulster County, New York. His initiative was one of the earliest efforts to coordinate the work of the different peace organizations in the United States and to enlist political, as well as public, support for the judicial settlement of international disputes.

Smiley had previously organized conferences devoted to other benevolent causes. The Lake Mohonk Conferences of the Friends of the Indian and On the Negro Question were established for the purposes of educating the public about the affairs of the “less favoured and more or less dependent races” and creating public sentiment in favour

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37 David S. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 27.
of reform legislation.\textsuperscript{39} Inspired by a spirit of Christian kindliness and a paternalistic feeling towards Africans and aboriginal people, Smiley believed that Americans had a duty to educate and morally uplift racial minorities in order to help them reach the stature of full U.S. citizenship. Smiley’s undertaking helped coordinate the work of the Board of Indian Commissioners, and of missionaries and reformers both overseas and at home.

The peace conferences organized at Lake Mohonk were intended to benefit the arbitration movement in a similar way. The purpose of the first meeting in 1895 was to discuss methods for promoting an arbitration treaty between Britain and the United States. Based on the background of the delegates who attended, it is evident that peace was treated as a moral and religious question. In addition to representatives from the existing peace societies, Smiley also invited clergymen, editors of religious periodicals, a small number of jurists and principals of small colleges. They all shared a belief that as a superior political power, the United States had a world-civilizing mission and that an Anglo-American treaty was necessary to guide other nations toward peaceful cooperation.\textsuperscript{40}

The arbitration movement of the late nineteenth century had ideological and political undertones which gave it a more explicit purpose and which also attracted a wider variety of supporters. The first Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration coincided with the escalation of tensions over the Venezuela-British Guinea boundary dispute. Britain’s refusal to settle the question diplomatically aggravated

\textsuperscript{39} For a history of the Lake Mohonk Conferences of the Friends of the Indian, see Merrill E. Gates, “Historical Address-Twenty-Five Years at The Lake Mohonk Indian Conference,” in \textit{Proceedings of The Twenty-Fifth Annual Meeting of The Lake Mohonk Conference of The Friends of The Indian and Other Dependent Peoples, 1907} (Lake Mohonk, New York: The Lake Mohonk Conference, 1907), 181-199.

\textsuperscript{40} For the purposes and topics of discussion at the First Lake Mohonk Conference, see Albert K. Smiley, “Opening Address,” in \textit{Report of the First Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1895} (Lake Mohonk, New York: The Lake Mohonk Conference, 1895), 5-6; A list of delegates is available on p.84 of the \textit{Report}. 
relations with the United States. As a self-proclaimed custodian of the Western hemisphere, the American government considered British interference in South America a challenge to its political hegemony. Throughout the course of diplomatic negotiations, President Grover Cleveland and Secretary of State Richard Olney invoked the Monroe Doctrine to justify the U.S. government’s demand to submit the Venezuela dispute to arbitration. Under diplomatic pressure, Britain’s foreign minister Julian Pauncefote signed arbitration agreements with both Venezuela and the United States and the crisis was thus resolved by 1897.\(^{41}\) The signing of the Olney-Pauncefote agreement represented an attempt by the American government to confirm its supremacy in the Western hemisphere. A general treaty of arbitration compelled observance of the Monroe Doctrine, as it bound the signatories to find peaceful resolutions to existing conflicts before resorting to military action. Moreover, it also eliminated the necessity of signing a formal alliance with any nation which would entail diplomatic responsibilities on behalf of the United States and which would also represent a departure from the policy of isolationism. Thus, despite Senate’s rejection of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty, after the Venezuela Crisis, the arbitration movement acquired greater political significance and continued to expand.\(^{42}\)

Although no reference was made at the first Lake Mohonk Conference to the Venezuela crisis, delegates have, on separate occasions, used the Monroe Doctrine to illustrate the United States’ position in relation to the rest of the world. In 1898, W. Martin Jones included in his speech an excerpt from Thomas Jefferson’s letter to James

\(^{41}\) Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 31.
\(^{42}\) For an analysis of Senate’s justifications for rejecting the Olney-Pauncefote treaty, see: Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 40; Kuehl, *Seeking World Order*, 41-42.
Monroe which outlined the basis of the Doctrine prior to its announcement. The document served to remind the guests at Lake Mohonk that maintaining friendly relations with Great Britain was of strategic importance for the United States. Since the greatest threat to American interests came from Her Majesty’s government, a “cordial friendship” would eliminate the danger of war and allow the United States to preserve its hegemonic position in the Western hemisphere. Jones also reminded his audience about Britain’s traditional hostility and skepticism towards the Republic. The rapprochement of recent times was merely the result of Britain’s recognition of American supremacy and not a genuine effort to improve relations. Thus, while true amity may never be possible, a general treaty of arbitration could at least guarantee peace between the two nations.\textsuperscript{43}

According to some delegates at Lake Mohonk, the Monroe Doctrine also provided a justification for imperialism. In 1903, Lyman Abbott declared America’s guardianship over its “weaker brethren” an indisputable right which could not be subject to arbitration. Since the Hague tribunal did not represent any South American countries, it had no authority to determine Washington’s policy towards them. While arbitration could be used for a variety of disputes, it carried certain limitations which guaranteed the United States complete jurisdiction over its foreign and domestic policies.\textsuperscript{44} The politicization of the arbitration movement in the late nineteenth century was closely linked to the establishment of U.S. colonial presence in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The arguments which were presented in favour of overseas expansionism also provided a rationale for the creation of permanent international peace. During the Philippine-

\textsuperscript{43} W. Martin Jones, “Possible Dangers to the Republic from Concert of Action Among European Nations,” in \textit{Lake Mohonk Conference, 1898}, 49-53.
\textsuperscript{44} Lyman Abbot, “Arbitration as an Ideal, and Its Present Limitations,” in \textit{Lake Mohonk Conference, 1903}, 48.
American War, Anglo-Saxonism became a powerful ideological tool for advocates of imperialism. Based on the notions of racial superiority and common racial destiny, the British Empire was used as an example of the future territorial expansion of the United States. According to proponents of Anglo-Saxonism, the colonization of territories which were populated by “inferior” races, such as the Philippines, was justifiable as a result of specific qualities of the English-speaking people. The racial discourse emphasized the westward expansion of the Anglo-Saxons, thereby suggesting that the annexation of the Philippines by the United States represented historical continuity. The Anglo-Saxons had crossed the Atlantic and successfully conquered the primitive races of North America. Expansion into the Pacific was a natural continuation of their ongoing westward march. In addition, the war against the Filipinos was interpreted as an extension of the Indian Wars, since, in both cases, civilized Americans were conquering “savages.” By pointing out the similarities between the two conflicts, advocates of imperialism were able to mask overseas expansionism, which represented a departure in foreign policy, as an example of the American government’s efforts to promote civilization and enlightenment among backward people. Since the Filipinos were considered incapable of self-rule, American tutelage was necessary to cultivate “civilized” political institutions and habits of thought.45

The Darwinian concept of “survival of the fittest” helped legitimize the American conquest of Indians and Filipinos as the triumph of a highly advanced civilization over backward and primitive races. Due to their superior fitness, martial spirit and ability to

administer colonies with diverse climates, Anglo-Saxons assimilated weaker nations through a process of natural selection. In addition to inheriting Anglo-Saxon traditions in law and government, the American people also acquired the manliness and virility which were characteristic of their racial ancestry. Popular representations of the Indian Wars often depicted the American settler as the embodiment of Anglo-Saxon physical strength and courage. In Theodore Roosevelt’s book *The Winning of the West*, the frontiersman established control of the land through masculine combat with the savage Indian. The frontier itself represented the battlefield where the American identity was forged. While the frontiersman carried the Anglo-Saxon spirit, he adopted the violent savagery of the Indian in order to promote the advancement of a higher civilization on the American continent. Despite these accomplishments, the late nineteenth century influenced fears of losing Anglo-Saxon superiority. The influx of immigrants from “inferior” ethnicities, such as Jews and Eastern Europeans, and the emancipation of African slaves in the South made proponents of Anglo-Saxonism suspicious about the possibility of racial contamination. Racial decadence was also possible as a result of the debilitating effects which civilized, peaceful society had on masculinity. The barbaric races of South America, the Caribbean and the Philippines possessed the manly vigour and belligerent spirit which were deemed necessary for territorial conquest. As Roosevelt suggested, if Americans, who enjoyed a peaceful existence, lost touch with their primal fighting instincts, a more manful race could strip them of their political hegemony. Roosevelt thus justified imperialism as defence of national manhood. The wars against Spain and the Philippines were welcomed as opportunities for renewal of Anglo-Saxon masculine vigour through military conquest. Carrying out the “white man’s burden” overseas was a
manly duty which not only promoted the interests of civilization, but it also guaranteed
the health of the American nation.\textsuperscript{46}

While Darwinism permeated the political discourse, it also had an impact on the
social sciences. Influenced by the theory of evolution, anthropologists and historians
published taxonomic classifications of the human races. The belief in humanity’s linear
progression from barbarity to civilization led to the emergence of scholarly predictions
about the decline of militarism and the establishment of permanent international peace. In
\textit{The Principles of Sociology}, the English philosopher Herbert Spencer outlined his theory
of social evolution based on the transition from militancy to industrialism. According to
Spencer, belligerent tendencies were characteristic of primitive nations which competed
for land and resources. In highly advanced industrial societies, which had outgrown the
necessity to fight for survival, there existed a tendency towards peace and voluntary
cooperation.\textsuperscript{47} Spencer’s theory influenced the writings of American historian John Fiske.
His series of highly influential lectures published collectively under the title \textit{American
Political Ideas} combined the concept of Anglo-Saxon superiority with plans for the
future organization of the world. Fiske argued that not only the American continent, but
the entire world was destined to be populated by the rapidly expanding Anglo-Saxon
race. The democratic system embodied in the New England town and the federative
structure of the United States provided the basis for a political union of civilized states in
which peace would be maintained by voluntary consent. Fiske’s vision of benevolent

\textsuperscript{46} Gail Bederman, \textit{Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States,
\textsuperscript{47} Herbert Spencer, \textit{The Principles of Sociology, Volume II} (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1900),
240-241; for a discussion of the militant and industrial types of society in the same volume: 568-603; 603-
643.
imperialism, which was meant to enlighten the less advanced races, thus involved plans for the expansion of American political influence without recourse to military action.\textsuperscript{48}

Anglo-Saxonism and ideas about race and empire were echoed at Lake Mohonk. The long history of shared traditions in English and American government and law provided a rationale for closer cooperation between Britain and the United States in the service of international peace. An Anglo-American treaty of arbitration was desirable not only as a confirmation of fraternity between the two nations, but also as an example of international cooperation which other countries must follow. Delegates at the conference generally agreed that the United States was destined to play a leading role in the establishment of permanent peace. According to Edward Everett Hale, war could be eliminated if the nations of the world adopted the democratic ideals upon which America was established. The federative union of independent states represented “the oldest [...] and most successful peace society which the world has ever known.”\textsuperscript{49} Hale suggested that the Great Powers should organize a similar federation of civilized nations in which all disputes would be adjudicated by a permanent tribunal modelled after the U.S. Supreme Court. Vested with authority by the people, the Supreme Court was not only the ultimate symbol of democracy, but also a guarantor of peaceful coexistence which had successfully prevented war on multiple occasions.\textsuperscript{50} Hale was not the only speaker at Lake Mohonk convinced in the superiority of American institutions. The reverend Josiah


\textsuperscript{49} Edward Everett Hale, “Address of Edward Everett Hale,” in Lake Mohonk Conference, 1895, 21. Similar views were also expressed by Mr. James Wood at the Conference during the same year: “Address of Mr. James Wood,” in Lake Mohonk Conference, 1895, 43-45.

\textsuperscript{50} Hale, “Address,” in Lake Mohonk Conference, 1895, 23.
Strong argued that civil liberty and pure spiritual Christianity, the greatest human ideals whose bearers were the Anglo-Saxons, were practiced most freely in the United States.\textsuperscript{51}

Inspired by Herbert Spencer, Strong also believed that industrialization facilitated permanent international peace. The civilized nations were united by a likeness of purpose and a willingness to cooperate which would eventually eliminate the possibility of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{52}

During the first decade of the twentieth century, the number of delegates at Lake Mohonk increased significantly. In addition to the leaders of the existing peace societies and organizations devoted to the judicial settlement of international disputes, businessmen, lawyers, Congressmen, scholars and journalists also attended the conferences. Among the most distinguished members were Secretaries of State, such as John W. Foster and William Jennings Bryan, John Bassett Moore, member of the Hague Tribunal and a leading legal scholar, President Howard Taft and the publisher and philanthropist Edwin Ginn.\textsuperscript{53} Albert Smiley also invited leaders of public opinion and well-known university professors, including the directors of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The President of Columbia University Nicholas Murray Butler was appointed Chairman at Lake Mohonk for several years, while John Bates Clark and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} Strong expressed these views in his influential book \textit{Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis} (New York: The Baker and Taylor Co., 1885), 161.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Josiah Strong, “Methods of Promoting Arbitration,” in \textit{Lake Mohonk Conference, 1898}, 73-75.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Foster and Moore represented the international lawyer establishment at Lake Mohonk and participated in the formation of the American Society of International Law in 1905. Foster also served as Chairman of the conference in 1906. See “Report of the Meeting to Consider the Subject of the Organization of an American International Law Society,” in \textit{Lake Mohonk Conference, 1905}; “Opening Address of the Chairman,” in \textit{Lake Mohonk Conference, 1906}. Although Edwin Ginn did not attend Lake Mohonk every year, he had been taking part in the proceedings since 1901; Taft served as Chairman of the conference in 1916; see “Program of the League to Enforce Peace,” in \textit{Lake Mohonk Conference, 1916}, 54-65; Bryan took part in the proceedings in 1910; see “The Forces that Make for Peace,” in \textit{Lake Mohonk Conference, 1910}, 164-173.
\end{itemize}
James Brown Scott served on various public relations committees and participated in the proceedings. Although Smiley was not directly involved in the establishment of the Carnegie Endowment, his efforts to create public sentiment favourable to international arbitration influenced the future character of the organization. The delegates at Lake Mohonk developed methods for enlisting cooperation from institutions responsible for shaping public opinion. In this way, they hoped to establish a nation-wide network of support which may influence government policy.

Each year, the conference appointed a Business Committee which maintained correspondence with major boards of trade and chambers of commerce and distributed pamphlets presenting economic arguments in favor of international peace. A similar Committee on Colleges and Universities was in charge of encouraging scholarly debates among students and professors on the significance of international arbitration. In addition, the Permanent Office at Lake Mohonk distributed the proceedings from the conferences to the general public and exchanged information with individuals who wished to cooperate on behalf of Mr. Smiley. The popularity of the Lake Mohonk Conferences is indicative of the growing significance of international arbitration in the early twentieth century. However, the overall success of the peace movement should not

\[54\] Butler served as Chairman in 1907 and between 1908 and 1912. Clark and Scott periodically served on the Business, Press or Finance Committees. Their duties are listed in the Preface of each edition of the Conferences’ Reports.

[55] The Business Committee was established in 1902 and distributed its first circular to business organizations the following year. See “Report of a Special Committee to Bring The Question of International Arbitration to Business Organizations,” in Lake Mohonk Conference, 1904; The Committee on Colleges and Universities was established in 1905. See “Memorandum on Work Among Undergraduates in Colleges and Universities,” in Lake Mohonk Conference, 1905, 136. Each year, the Committee awarded the Pugsley Essay Prize to the student writing the best essay on the history of the peace movement. See “Report of Work of the Lake Mohonk Conference Among Colleges and Universities 1909-1910,” in Lake Mohonk Conference, 1896, 137.

be exaggerated. Political support for the judicial settlement of international disputes remained fairly limited. Although some American presidents were favourable to the idea, there was no sufficient lobby in Congress to guarantee legislative success for arbitration treaties. Senate blocked the ratification of several arbitration agreements between 1897 and 1911. Opposition generally emerged as a result of certain clauses which threatened the constitutional prerogative of the Upper House. The *compromise*, or special agreement between the U.S. President and the other party involved in a dispute, was considered a major obstacle to Senate’s involvement in matters relating to foreign policy. Another contentious issue was the submission of conflicts concerning the vital interests or “national honour” of the United States to an international tribunal. Thus, as a result of Senatorial opposition and the general state of international affairs prior to World War I, the aspirations of arbitration advocates were never fully realized.  

**Andrew Carnegie’s Views on Imperialism, Philanthropy and Peace**

Andrew Carnegie’s involvement in the arbitration movement is illustrative of the social and political activities of prominent American businessmen in the early twentieth century. His long-term interest in international peace was an outgrowth of a general concern for the improvement of mankind. Carnegie was among the several wealthy industrialists whose public benefactions shaped the image of modern philanthropy. His charitable organizations, like the free public libraries which were built across North America and Britain and the Carnegie Institute of Washington, became symbols of the

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57 For an analysis of Senate’s justifications for rejecting the arbitration treaties proposed by the Roosevelt and Taft administrations in 1904 and 1911, see: Kuehl, *Seeking World Order*, 60-62; Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 174-176.
idea that private donations should replace government expenses towards social welfare.

In his essay *The Gospel of Wealth*, which discussed the purposes of philanthropy, Carnegie argued that as representatives of the nation’s progressive elite, millionaires had a moral obligation to reform society by donating surplus revenue to benevolent causes, such as education, healthcare, art and culture. But the character of Carnegie’s benefactions suggests that he was often guided by his political beliefs, rather than a genuine compassion for the needs of the less fortunate. An examination of his biography reveals strong allegiance to the Republican Party, advocacy of imperialism and a firm belief in Social Darwinism. He contributed to the preservation of those principles which he considered responsible for his own financial success and worked towards the advancement of Republican political ideas.

The writings of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer appealed to Carnegie since they provided an explanation for his personal story of progress through struggle. He believed that social and economic inequalities were the inevitable outcome of the principle of “survival of the fittest” which ensured the advancement of human civilization. Millionaires like himself were justified in accumulating wealth as a result of their superior talents, hard work and ambition. The capitalist system, which existed in the United States, was one of humanity’s greatest accomplishments because it provided

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59 Carnegie advocated, for example, the establishment of a League of Nations which would have policing powers and which could use military force to restore peace. President Roosevelt, a personal friend of Carnegie, also supported the idea. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order*, 92.
opportunity for success to the most gifted and industrious individuals, while the lazy and incompetent occupied the lowest ranks of society. Carnegie argued that the greatest threats to the existing order were communism and anarchism. Not only did they contradict the evolutionary laws which governed society’s progress by blurring the differences between the capable and the unworthy, but they also deprived those who possessed business talents from the possibility of generating capital.\textsuperscript{61} The goal of philanthropy was, thus, to achieve reconciliation between the rich and the poor and to eliminate the conditions which created opportunity for a socialist revolution. To ensure that charitable donations would be distributed in the most efficient manner, Carnegie claimed that millionaires, who possessed “superior wisdom” and knowledge, should be in charge of administering surplus wealth.\textsuperscript{62}

In \textit{The Gospel of Wealth}, Carnegie cautioned against the indiscriminate distribution of resources. Donating money to the “slothful, the drunken and the unworthy” had an injurious effect on society because it encouraged pauperism and degradation.\textsuperscript{63} The “irreclaimably destitute, shiftless and worthless” individuals had to be put in government institutions in order to prevent them from spreading vices and wickedness among the rest of the poor.\textsuperscript{64} The purpose of philanthropy was to stimulate self-improvement and to endow those who were capable of success. Social evils could only be eliminated through measures which provided long-term results rather than temporary remedies. Therefore, the most useful benefactions, such as academic and

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 21.
Carnegie contributed a significant portion of his wealth towards the advancement of education. He made generous donations to universities in his native Scotland, providing funds for both students and retired professors, and also developed an extensive network of public libraries throughout the English-speaking world.

The organization which most closely resembled the Endowment for International Peace, in terms of both its administrative structure and its purposes, was the Carnegie Institution of Washington. The Institution promoted research into twelve different areas of science, including Experimental Evolution, Eugenics, History, Sociology and Economics. Each Department was endowed with its own building and facilities for research, while scientists collaborated with representatives from foreign countries in the realization of their projects. Carnegie consulted the nation’s academic, business and political elite on the establishment of the Institute. The plan for its foundation received the official sanction of President Theodore Roosevelt and was incorporated by an Act of Congress in 1904. Daniel Coit Gilman of Johns Hopkins University became the Carnegie Institute’s first President, while Secretary of State Elihu Root was appointed Chairman of the Board of Trustees which administered grants for scientific investigations. Among the trustees were several members of the Republican Party, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay and William Howard Taft. During the early years of

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65 Ibid., 18.
the Institute’s history, funds were appropriated for a variety of projects, including the launching of the Carnegie nonmagnetic ship for maritime exploration and the construction of the Mount Wilson Observatory.\textsuperscript{70}

Andrew Carnegie also made significant contributions to the international peace movement. In addition to his material donations, which included the Palace of Peace at the Hague and the Central American Court of Justice,\textsuperscript{71} he served as an informal diplomatic adviser to the United States President on European and South American affairs.\textsuperscript{72} His support for international arbitration and the establishment of a permanent Congress of Nations was inspired both by his personal convictions and by his frequent interactions with European and American statesmen. From the writings of Herbert Spencer, Carnegie acquired an idealistic belief in the gradual evolution of international relations within the “civilized world.”\textsuperscript{73} He also maintained correspondence with politicians who supported the arbitration movement, including members of the Campbell-Bannerman cabinet and Republican Party leaders like Theodore Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{74} Carnegie used his influence to promote political ideas which were consistent with his elitist worldview. His earliest contributions were related to the advancement of Anglo-American rapprochement. In 1887, he promoted the diplomatic mission of British Labour MP Randal Cremer whose purpose was to obtain President Cleveland’s support for an arbitration treaty.\textsuperscript{75}

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\item \textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 79-83.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 271-279; 279-283.
\item \textsuperscript{72} On Carnegie’s involvement in the Chilean Crisis and his participation in the First Pan American Congress, see: Carnegie, Autobiography, 345-6; 351-353. On Carnegie’s informal diplomatic mission prior to the Second Hague Conference, see Hendrick, The Life of Andrew Carnegie, 323-343.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Carnegie was particularly influenced by The Data of Ethics, First Principles, and Social Statics. See: Carnegie, Autobiography, 339.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Hendrick, The Life of Andrew Carnegie, 300-302; 306-309; 326-331;
\item \textsuperscript{75} Patterson, Toward a Warless World, 18-20.
\end{itemize}
In 1898, Carnegie expressed strong opposition to the annexation of the Philippines. He became Vice President of the Anti-Imperialist League and published a series of articles in which he criticized the policy of the U.S. government in the Pacific. In the context of the Philippine War, anti-imperialism did not indicate rejection of expansionism per se. Opposition emerged from the belief that the establishment of overseas colonialism contradicted the American republican tradition. Unlike the proponents of Anglo-Saxonism, who believed that common racial ancestry united British and American imperialism, anti-imperialists, like Carnegie, argued that the United States was destined to pursue a unique course of expansion. According to national-exceptionalist logic, the conquering of the West was the result of distinct American qualities, rather than Anglo-Saxon virtue. The role of the American nation was to expand in continuous, unpopulated territory where it would establish a higher civilization by promoting democracy and republicanism. The annexation of the Philippines represented a departure from the American tradition of settlement colonialism because it involved the subjugation of a race which had national aspirations to foreign rule. Anti-imperialists rejected the belief in shared geopolitical interests and common historical mission between Britain and the United States. They drew comparisons between the American Revolution and the Philippine war of independence and cautioned against following the footsteps of British tyranny.76

Carnegie embraced the national-exceptionalist argument in his writings. In Distant Possessions and Americanism vs. Imperialism, he outlined the economic, military

and political dangers which could result from the administration of a geographically remote colony like the Philippines. Colonial expansion in the Pacific required the construction of a large navy which would place an enormous financial burden on the government.\footnote{Carnegie, “Americanism vs. Imperialism II,” in \textit{The Gospel of Wealth}, 189; Carnegie, “Distant Possessions: The Parting of the Ways,” \textit{Ibid.}, 159;} In addition, the risky military situation in the Far East would make the United States dependent on support from Great Britain and damage its international prestige.\footnote{Ibid., 173-174.} According to Carnegie, the retention of the Philippines was also inconsistent with the principles of American expansionism. The colonization of populated territories was risky due to the possibility of national revolt among the natives.\footnote{Carnegie, “Distant Possessions,” 153.} Carnegie’s interpretation of the struggles for emancipation among “inferior races” was based on vague observations of recent events in the Pacific and the Caribbean. Although he recognized that even the most backward peoples had a desire for independence, he also argued that no such tendencies existed among the populations of Cuba, Puerto Rico and Hawaii, which justified their annexation by the United States.\footnote{Ibid., 155.} By contrast, the inhabitants of the Philippines were not only hostile to foreign rule, but they were also ignorant of American institutions and habits of thought. Like proponents of Anglo-Saxonism, anti-imperialists used the notion of the Filipinos’ savagery to justify their claims. However, in this context, the supposed cultural and racial inferiority of foreign races served as an argument for rejecting their incorporation into the United States. As Carnegie suggested, the Filipinos’ low level of civilization made them unfit for a
republican form of government and prevented them from adapting to American political
culture.  

Carnegie argued that the United States must establish a sphere of influence in
North America and the Caribbean and not take any imperial lessons from Britain. In fact, he believed that only the United States was capable of establishing Anglo-Saxon
domination and of cultivating democratic institutions among the less advanced nations. Britain was declining as a colonial power and was soon to be outstripped by the United States in terms of economic and industrial growth. It was destined to reach the status of “moral ascendancy” and become the equivalent of ancient Greece in Europe. Although Britain would always be recognized as the source of Anglo-Saxon culture and wisdom, it would no longer be a political or military force. By contrast, one of the main factors which guaranteed the greatness of the United States was the republican federal form of
government, since it gave equal opportunity for success to all citizens regardless of their
descent. In his book *Triumphant Democracy*, Carnegie praised the virtues of
republicanism and advocated the adoption of the American political model by all
countries, including Britain. He even proposed the establishment of a federation of
states within the United Kingdom as an alternative to Irish Home Rule. While Scotland, Wales and Ireland could form local legislatures, the English Parliament would have the
status of supreme political authority in order to put an end to separatism.

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Territorial expansion within the Western hemisphere also allowed for more efficient use of resources, since it did not require the construction of additional military bases. Carnegie believed that empires like Russia, which encompassed coterminous territories, were destined to establish world domination, while the geographically scattered possessions of Britain, France, Spain and Portugal were vulnerable to both internal revolts and attacks from outside.\(^8\) The country whose policy of expansion Carnegie admired the most was Germany. As the second industrial power in the world, it represented the equivalent of the United States in Europe and had a special civilizing mission among the imperial nations.\(^6\) Carnegie referred to Kaiser Wilhelm II as a “man of Destiny” and an “apostle of peace” whose duty was to preserve international understanding and promote economic prosperity by uniting all of Europe into a federation of states which would be governed by a constitution based on German and American principles.\(^7\) Despite Germany’s militaristic foreign policy, Carnegie maintained a blind optimism regarding the Kaiser’s willingness to promote international arbitration. On the eve of the second Hague Conference, he suggested that Germany should be in charge of establishing a League of Peace which would maintain international order through military and economic sanctions. As all existing disputes would be adjudicated by the Hague Tribunal, war would eventually become obsolete.\(^8\) Despite the modest achievements of the Hague Conference in 1907, Carnegie did not abandon his support for the

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\(^{85}\) Carnegie, *Distant Possessions*, 164.


establishment of the League and continued to seek cooperation from peace advocates in the following years.

The Establishment of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Both personal motives and specific events within the American peace movement influenced Carnegie’s decision to establish the Endowment for International Peace. The delegates at the Lake Mohonk Conferences believed that the existing peace societies had to be integrated into a single organization in order to be more successful at promoting international arbitration. As early as 1903, Edwin Ginn suggested that a permanent, central body, which was essentially a prototype of the Carnegie Endowment, should be in charge of distributing funds for educational purposes to pacifist groups. Ginn also proposed that Andrew Carnegie, who had just recently endowed the Hague Tribunal with a permanent building, should contribute financially to the establishment of this organization.\(^{89}\) Several years later, when Carnegie received a formal proposal for the founding of a peace endowment, he appeared lukewarm to the idea.\(^{90}\) Nevertheless, the subject of reorganizing the arbitration movement was discussed at Lake Mohonk in the following years. In 1909, Nicholas Butler appointed a Committee of Ten, which included Andrew Carnegie, Elihu Root and James Brown Scott, to consider the formation of a national Arbitration Council. Butler and Root took charge of drafting a concrete plan for a peace endowment which was subject to Carnegie’s approval.\(^{91}\)


In addition to the proposals by Butler and Root, several events convinced Carnegie of the necessity to endow the peace movement. In the summer of 1910, his long-term dream for the establishment of a League of Peace between the Great Powers was disillusioned. Earlier that year, Carnegie exchanged private correspondence with Theodore Roosevelt in which he instructed the former president to convert Kaiser Wilhelm II to the idea of forming a peace league during his upcoming visit to Berlin. Since Roosevelt’s overtures to the Kaiser failed to produce the desired result, Carnegie decided that a new approach for the advancement of international peace was necessary.92 Meanwhile, as the pleas for financial assistance from peace organizations mounted, the need for the establishment of a fund became more apparent. One specific event inspired Carnegie’s faith in the success of the arbitration movement. Although he makes no reference to this fact in his autobiography, President Taft’s decision to support the submission of all existing disputes to an international tribunal seems to have confirmed that pacifism was worth financing.93 Thus, in the end of 1910, Carnegie finally announced to a board of twenty-eight trustees the endowment of ten million dollars “to hasten the abolition of international war, the foulest blot upon our civilization.”94

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was established for the purpose of educating the public about the causes and consequences of war through the publication of scientific reports. This was an innovative approach to the advancement of international peace which had only recently been developed by the World Peace Foundation. Although

92 On Roosevelt’s disillusionment from his visit to the Kaiser, see: Hendrick, The Life of Andrew Carnegie, 331.
93 Ibid., 338.
its founder, Edwin Ginn, put the same emphasis on research and education as Carnegie, his organization inherited the membership, ideas and attitudes of older peace societies. As a result of insufficient funding, the work of the World Peace Foundation was often limited to the distribution of propaganda and had a much less scientific character. By contrast, the Carnegie Endowment represented a complete break from the past, both in terms of its membership and its purposes. Among the trustees and directors, there were well-known international lawyers, businessmen, scholars and politicians, some of whom were involved in Carnegie’s existing benefactions. Two of the trustees, Elihu Root and Nicholas Butler, were members of the Republican Party, while the directors of the three divisions were prominent Columbia University professors whose scholarly careers were heavily influenced by Social Darwinism.

The trustees of the Carnegie Endowment shared an idealistic belief in the emergence of a harmonious community between the “civilized” nations of the world in which peace was maintained by virtue of economic and diplomatic cooperation and respect for national boundaries. According to this view, in advanced industrial societies, the law was sanctioned by public opinion. Citizens remained loyal to the state not as a result of legal sanctions, but because they feared social condemnation. The same

96 For the list of trustees, see A Manual of the Public Benefactions of Andrew Carnegie, 179-183; For a detailed analysis of the trustees’ backgrounds, see: Marchand, The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 120-122.
97 Nicholas Butler and Elihu Root were known for their support of the Republican Party. For a detailed analysis of their political views, see Sondra H. Herman, Eleven Against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898-1921 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), 22-54. The publications of Butler, James Brown Scott and John Bates Clark, and their addresses at Lake Mohonk, shared many of the ideas expressed in Social Statics and The Principles of Sociology, particularly the concept of social equilibrium and the transition from militancy to peace.
98 Elihu Root, The Sanction of International Law: Presidential Address Before the Second Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1908 (New York: American Branch of the Association of
principle applied to the international community and provided an incentive for the
popularization of judicial methods for the settlement of disputes. The role of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace as an educational institution was, thus, to mould
public opinion in order to create a suitable environment for the advancement of
international law. As all international differences were essentially legal in nature,
universal peace would be possible if countries agreed to submit their disputes to an
impartial tribunal.

Carnegie appointed Elihu Root, a skillful lawyer and diplomat who had made
significant contributions to the expansion of American imperialism throughout his career,
as president of the board of trustees. Root’s involvement in the Carnegie Endowment, and
his general advocacy of international law, were hardly the result of a genuine belief in
pacifism. As Secretary of War during William McKinley’s presidency, he provided legal
expertise for the construction of the administration’s colonial policy in Cuba, Puerto Rico
and the Philippines. Root’s justification for imperialism was based on a benevolent
conception of America’s duty to promote democracy and self-government among the
inhabitants of Spain’s former colonies. He was a firm advocate of preparedness and
supported military intervention by the United States as a method of enforcing the Monroe
Doctrine. One of his chief contributions as Secretary of War was the introduction of
military reform to increase the army’s capacity for war.99 He later declared his
endorsement of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine which sanctioned the

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99 For a summary of Root’s political career, see James Brown Scott, “Elihu Root,” in The American
Secretaries of States and Their Diplomacy, ed. Samuel F. Bemis (New York: Cooper Square Publishes,
United States’ policing powers in the Western Hemisphere for the sake of promoting stability and order. During his subsequent career as Secretary of State, Root continued to advocate U.S. tutelage over South America. He promoted the establishment of the Central American Court of justice as the most effective way to conduct foreign policy with the countries from that region. Root also advocated a permanent tribunal at the Hague for the purpose of settling diplomatic affairs with European powers without sacrificing the principles of non-intervention.  

Nicholas Butler, director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of Intercourse, shared Root’s advocacy of American imperialism and his view of international politics. Through his frequent interactions with European statesmen, scholars and diplomats, Butler acquired a lifelong interest in foreign relations and the advancement of international understanding. He argued that the educated elite of each country should direct public opinion and conduct diplomatic affairs for the successful establishment of a peaceful international community. Butler’s doctrine of the International Mind most clearly illustrates this attitude. The International Mind represented the ability to restrain nationalistic passions and to regard the “several nations of the civilized world” as “cooperating equals” which shared a common interest in economic and cultural

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100 Herman, Eleven Against War, 34-37. As Secretary of State in Roosevelt’s administration, Root was also responsible for drafting the instructions for the American delegates to the Second Hague Conference. Central to the agenda of the American delegation was the creation of a permanent tribunal at the Hague based on the Supreme Court of the United States. See: Elihu Root, “Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Conference of 1907,” in Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Peace Conferences and their Official Reports, ed. James Brown Scott (New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1916), 69-86.

101 In his autobiography, Butler writes that his interest in international understanding originated during his student years in Europe. Through his advisory work on behalf of the American delegation to the First Hague Conference, he acquired a deeper interest in pacifism and met many prominent figures in the international peace movement, including Baron d’Estournelles de Constant. Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years: Recollections and Reflections, Volume II (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1935), 86-89.
progress.\textsuperscript{102} Similar to Root, Butler’s advocacy of international understanding did not necessarily indicate a belief in the abolition of war. Peace itself was not an ideal, but a condition resulting naturally from the advancement of justice and civil liberty. The establishment of democratic institutions was, thus, the first step towards the adoption of a peaceful approach to international relations.\textsuperscript{103} Butler believed that in economically underdeveloped nations, there was a militaristic tendency which threatened the establishment of a peaceful world order. The naval appropriations of the Great Powers were, therefore, justified as a necessary measure for the protection of strategic interests.\textsuperscript{104} In a similar way, American colonial presence in Puerto Rico and the Philippines was required for the establishment of democratic institutions among the less advanced nations and for maintaining order and stability in Washington’s sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{105}

The Division of Intercourse and Education was organized according to Butler’s concept of the International Mind. Under his leadership, it became one of the first modern think tanks on international relations which maintained offices in Washington, Paris and Tokyo. Men of science and diplomatic experts from various countries contributed their knowledge to the advancement of international understanding independently from their respective governments. The projects organized by the Division had an educational character and aimed at reforming existing attitudes towards peace and influencing a

\textsuperscript{102} Nicholas Butler, \textit{The International Mind: An Argument for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes} (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1912), 102.
\textsuperscript{103} Nicholas Butler, \textit{A World in Ferment: Interpretations of the War for a New World} (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1919), 8.
\textsuperscript{104} Nicholas Butler, “Opening Address,” in \textit{Lake Mohonk Conference, 1910}, 18.
\textsuperscript{105} Butler expressed this view in a letter that he addressed to President McKinley in 1898. In his autobiography, Butler credits himself for the development of the Administration’s colonial policy. Butler, \textit{Across the Busy Years Volume II}, 346-349.
gradual shift in the standards of international conduct.\textsuperscript{106} Prior to the United States’ entry into World War I, funds from the Carnegie trust were appropriated for uplifting backward regions which were situated outside the “civilized world.” A series of reports devoted to the Orient, the Balkans and Latin America appeared within the first several years of the Division’s establishment. The publications contained first-hand observations of the prospects for the advancement of international law in countries formerly subject to colonial rule.\textsuperscript{107}

The inquiries concerning East Asia and Latin America were organized as informal diplomatic missions which promoted cultural exchange and friendship with the United States. “Representative men,” such as the President of Harvard University, Charles W. Eliot, and former Secretary of State Robert Bacon, visited local statesmen, intellectuals and other “leaders of public opinion” for the purpose of establishing support networks and popularizing the work of the Carnegie Endowment. The goal of Bacon’s trip to South America, for example, was to secure the support of political leaders for the establishment of organizations devoted to promoting international arbitration.\textsuperscript{108} Although these reports recommended methods for establishing peace, they were based on personal impressions rather than scholarly research. By contrast, the investigation of the Balkan Wars represented the first formal attempt by the Carnegie Endowment to solve an international

\textsuperscript{107} Of the sixteen publications released by the Division between 1912 and 1919, four were devoted to East Asia, six to South America and two to the Balkans, while the rest discussed the Russian Revolution and educational reform in public schools. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, \textit{A Manual of the Public Benefactions of Andrew Carnegie}, 190.  
crisis in a scientific manner. Well-known experts in the fields of economics, international law, history and politics collected first-hand evidence of atrocities from the sites of war and established responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities based on impartial investigation of existing data. The validity of their findings was guaranteed by the fact that none of the belligerent nations participated in the investigation. The presence of an educated elite from the six Great Powers further reinforced the sense of moral and intellectual superiority.\textsuperscript{109}

Prior to the report of the International Commission, the Carnegie Endowment released another publication in relation to the Balkan Wars. Professor Wilhelm Paszkowski’s account of German foreign relations in 1913 demonstrated that the conflicts in South-East Europe failed to disturb the peace between the Great Powers and contributed to increased international cooperation. His arguments were supported by numerous examples of friendly diplomatic exchanges, press publications and scholarly visits between Germany, the United States, England and France. Paszkowski’s most remarkable observation was that the Balkan Wars had contributed to the conciliation between England and Germany, despite the diplomatic crisis on the eve of World War I. While he made no reference to the two countries’ policies towards Russia, he argued that it was in their common interest to “put an end to the onward march of the Slavs to the Bosphorus.”\textsuperscript{110} Paszkowski’s report confirms the Balkan Commission’s argument that the Great Powers were not involved in the outbreak of the conflicts. The Carnegie


Endowment evidently believed that its approach towards international conciliation was successful and that the Balkan Wars occurred not as a result of European imperialism, but due to the “primitivism” of the belligerents.

Research into the causes and effects of war was also conducted at the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of Economics and History. Its director, John Bates Clark, was an economics professor whose theory of industrial progress was heavily influenced by the writings of Herbert Spencer. Clark shared Butler’s hopes for the establishment of a federation between the “civilized” countries. His addresses at Lake Mohonk demonstrated the different ways in which economic forces contributed to the preservation of international peace. As a result of the globalized nature of capitalist economies, military confrontations created major disruptions in business and commerce. If the government leaders of industrial nations were educated about the disastrous economic effects of war, they would voluntarily choose arbitration as the only method for settling their differences. Although Clark advocated international law as a substitute for war, he argued that military conquest by the Great Powers was justifiable because it had a civilizing effect upon economically underdeveloped nations. According to the principle of “survival of the fittest,” weaker states were absorbed by their more powerful neighbours. Under Clark’s leadership, the Division of Economics maintained a Committee of Research composed of an international group of experts who recommended topics for investigation. The Division’s most significant publications, including the

111 For a summary of Clark’s economic theories, see Herman, Eleven Against War, 59-61; 67.
Preliminary Economic Studies of the War, were released after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.113

Some of the most strategically important projects of the Carnegie Endowment were organized by James Brown Scott, Director of the Division of Intercourse and Education. Throughout his career as jurist and legal scholar, Scott had contributed significantly to the advancement of international law as a method of conducting foreign affairs. Prior to the establishment of the Carnegie Endowment, Scott had served as Solicitor to the United States Department of State and he was also a co-founder of the American Society of International Law. Through his work on behalf of the Society, Scott made connections with a number of influential political leaders and businessmen, including Root and Carnegie.114 A common goal of all international lawyers within the peace movement was the establishment of a Permanent International Tribunal at the Hague which was modelled after the United States Supreme Court. Scott believed that an institution of this sort could operate successfully as a result of the rapid progress of international relations in recent times. As nations would voluntarily agree to settle their differences through diplomacy, no mechanism for the enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions would be necessary other than the sanction of public opinion in the civilized world.115

113 For a complete list of the Division’s publications between 1915 and 1919, see A Manual of the Public Benefactions of Andrew Carnegie, 190-192.
Scott also argued that like common law, international law developed organically and was based on precedent.\(^{116}\) Thus, the bulk of the publications which were released under his direction at the Carnegie Endowment were related to the formalization and codification of international law. Historically significant documents, such as the Hague Conventions and Declarations, and the decisions of the Hague Court and other international tribunals, were released in pamphlet and volume form. A collection featuring the decisions of the United States Supreme Court served as an illustration of the methods and practices which the future Permanent Tribunal at the Hague would adopt. In addition, several collections on Latin America contained important diplomatic documents, including the Monroe Doctrine. The Division also organized projects along educational lines and contributed to the popularization of international law as a scholarly discipline. It subsidized the activities of several European and Pan-American organizations, such as the Institut de Droit International, the Société de Législation Comparée and the American Institute of International Law. The launching of the Academy of International Law at the Hague was another major project which was put to a halt due to the outbreak of World War I in 1914.\(^{117}\)

**Conclusion**

The Carnegie Report was influenced by several major developments within the history of the American peace movement. Although pacifism was traditionally advocated by conservative religious groups and carried little significance for contemporary politics,

\(^{116}\) Ibid., 69.

the growth of American imperialism in the late nineteenth century influenced a slow but steady transformation. As the history of the Carnegie Endowment shows, the advocates of international arbitration were inspired not by a genuine interest in the abolition of war, but by their desire to conduct foreign policy according to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. By promoting general treaties of arbitration, the United States could establish a strong international presence without making formal alliances with the Great Powers. The founders of the Endowment, including Andrew Carnegie, Elihu Root and Nicholas Butler, were favourable to imperialism. The leaders of the American peace movement also believed in Social Darwinism. Scientific theories about evolution and race influenced the emergence of a preconceived notion of the Balkans as backward and militant. As the Carnegie Report suggests, the Balkan Wars took place as a result of the primitivism of the belligerents and their inability to conform to “civilized” standards of international conduct. By contrast, the Great Powers had overcome their violent tendencies and were willing to cooperate in the preservation of international peace. The paternalistic attitude and condescending language expressed by the members of the Carnegie Commission confirm the existence of a binary between a harmonious and united West and a barbaric, violent East. As a result of their former colonial status and economic underdevelopment, the Balkans were easily stereotyped as turbulent and problematic by the authors of the Report.
Chapter II: The Appointment of the Carnegie Commission

The inquiry into the Balkan Wars was organized according to Nicholas Butler’s concept of the International Mind. A group of intellectuals who represented the opinion of the “civilized world” contributed to the improvement of international relations by virtue of their knowledge and expertise. The members of the Carnegie Commission believed that they were capable of promoting permanent international peace by educating the public about the horrors of the Balkan Wars. Their report was envisioned as an impartial study of the causes and consequences of the conflicts which was carried out independently from the governments of the Great Powers. Butler was personally responsible for organizing the inquiry and for appointing representatives to the sites of war. His initiative was influenced by the desire to establish the “truth” regarding the outrages committed by the Balkan armies. Since the reports which circulated in the press were contradictory, there was no “objective” source of information about the alleged atrocities. By ascertaining responsibility for the reported crimes, Butler hoped that the Carnegie Commission would demonstrate the significance of the International Mind for restoring justice and peace and promoting “civilized” methods for the resolution of disputes. In addition, through the appointment of notable representatives from Europe and the United States, he wanted to create the impression that the Great Powers were impartial to the Balkan Wars.  

This chapter will analyze Butler’s justifications for organizing the investigation and the challenges which the Balkan Commission experienced along its tour of the sites.

of war. Since he hoped to obtain as much publicity as possible, Butler appointed representatives who were well known experts on Balkan affairs and commanded considerable authority in their respective countries. Among the members of the Commission there were professors of international law, journalists, scholars and political leaders. As a result of the urgency with which he was acting, Butler did not consider the potential challenges which could obstruct the investigation and jeopardize the success of the Commission’s report. Despite the guarantee of impartiality, the reluctance of Austria and Germany to participate in the inquiry and the accusations which came from the Greek and Serbian governments offer a glimpse into the political tensions which existed in Europe on the eve of World War I. The Commission fell apart before the investigation even began and failed in its objective to appear as an unbiased arbiter in the conflict.

**Organizing the Commission**

Nicholas Butler proposed the appointment of the Balkan Commission in response to a series of highly sensationalized reports in the press which gave detailed accounts of the suffering of civilians at the hands of the belligerent armies. Shortly after the outbreak of the Second Balkan War in the summer of 1913, the Greek and Serbian governments launched a propaganda campaign in international media whose purpose was to justify military action against their former ally Bulgaria. Based on the testimony of eyewitnesses, foreign correspondents in Belgrade, Salonica and Serres reported acts of cruelty which “the imagination refuses to comprehend.”\(^\text{119}\) The Bulgarian army at Krivolak was accused of crucifying, mutilating and burning wounded Serbian soldiers.

Elsewhere, the Bulgarians allegedly massacred noncombatants and outraged women and young girls.\textsuperscript{120} While the reports made claims to authenticity, they were often based on anonymous sources and presented conflicting information. In a statement to \textit{The Evening News} from Sofia, Tsar Ferdinand denounced the Greek and Serbian allegations and gave an account of the repressions against Bulgarian citizens under foreign occupation. The Tsar further announced his support for an international inquiry which would “enlighten the world concerning the stories of these excesses.”\textsuperscript{121}

On July 18 and 19, \textit{The New York Times} published two dispatches from King Constantine of Greece which confirmed the earlier accounts of his countrymen and gave new information about “horrors such as human history has never before recorded.”\textsuperscript{122} In Demir-Hisar, Muslim women were outraged and then burned in a mosque to the music of bagpipes.\textsuperscript{123} According to Constantine, the greatest atrocities were committed in the city of Serres which was completely annihilated by the invading army. Acting under the authority of the military command, Bulgarian soldiers attacked the lives and property of all civilians, including foreign nationals. Administrative buildings, such as hospitals and schools, were deliberately destroyed, while the warehouse of the American Tobacco Company was set on fire, causing damage worth over one million dollars.\textsuperscript{124} The King’s most shocking revelation, which concerned the alleged public rape of the Austrian Consul’s wife, questioned the humanity of the Bulgarians.\textsuperscript{125} Immediately after the


\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.

publication of King Constantine’s declarations, Butler cabled Elihu Root and Paul Henri d’Estournelles de Constant, the President of the Carnegie Endowment’s European Advisory Council, with a proposal for sending a “notable commission” to the sites of war which would “ascertain facts and fix responsibility” for the reported crimes. Given the growing interest of international media in the Balkan Wars, “prompt action” was required on behalf of the Endowment in order to make the first extensive coverage of all sides of the conflict.  

Butler evidently considered the situation in the Balkans as an opportunity to demonstrate the usefulness of the International Mind for solving a military crisis. In the welter of conflicting reports from the Balkan states, the Carnegie Commission would step in as an impartial arbiter which would examine the validity of the reported crimes, determine responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities, assess the moral and economic losses from the wars, and thus guide the belligerents towards conciliation. But the ultimate goal of the Carnegie Commission was self-serving, rather than humanitarian. The material gathered in its report would provide the basis for antiwar propaganda which would enlighten public opinion in Europe and the United States. From the very beginning, Butler insisted that the Commission emphasize the moral and economic effects from the Balkan Wars and the lessons they teach to “civilized peoples.”  

He further recommended that the atrocities committed by the belligerents be treated as evidence of their “moral bankruptcy,” rather than as ordinary crimes. Clearly, the report of the Balkan Commission was intended to illustrate, to a Western audience, the

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horrors of war and the destruction resulting from the use of uncivilized methods for solving disputes. According to Butler, such a report would be invaluable for extending the influence and authority of the Carnegie Endowment and fixing its role as an advocate for the judicial settlement of international conflicts.129

In the correspondence he exchanged with d’Estournelles, Butler insisted on appointing the Commission to the sites of war before the hostilities had ended, so that the report could be published while the issue of Balkan atrocities was still relevant in the public mind.130 Although he was acting with a sense of urgency, he was cautious about the consequences which the inquiry might have on the reputation of the Carnegie Endowment. After a brief consultation conducted over cablegram, Butler, Root, Scott and d’Estournelles concluded that since the proposed investigation concerned European affairs, it would be wise to appoint the Commission through the Paris Bureau, rather than the Washington Office.131 The leaders of the Carnegie Endowment evidently treated the Balkan investigation as a diplomatic intervention despite its scientific character. Since the Endowment was an American institution, its jurisdiction over military conflicts which took place outside the Western hemisphere was limited. Although the Commission’s report would serve an educational purpose, it would inevitably dwell into the political affairs of Europe from which the United States was detached. The European Council compensated for this issue by authorizing investigations in countries which were not part of Washington’s sphere of influence. While the Balkan inquiry was formally organized

by the Paris Bureau, it was funded and coordinated through the efforts of the American branch of the Endowment.

Surprisingly, Butler did not inform Carnegie, who was visiting his Scotland residence at the time, about the inquiry and appointed the Commission without the latter’s knowledge. His action was likely influenced by the urgency with which he handled the project, or he might have also anticipated Carnegie’s disapproval of the idea. In a telegram addressed to d’Estournelles while the Commission was touring Balkans, Carnegie admitted that news of the investigation came to him as a shock and expressed skepticism about its practicality. Similar to Root and Scott, his reservations concerned the authority under which the inquiry was organized. He argued that the upcoming report could potentially antagonize the belligerents or compromise the reputation of the Endowment if the events described in it were accidentally misrepresented. Upon Butler’s recommendation, d’Estournelles sent Carnegie a detailed response in which he reassured him that far from excusing the actions of the belligerents, the report of the Balkan Commission sought to illustrate the horrors which they perpetrated. He further described the background of the commissioners, emphasizing their reliability and impartiality, and confirmed that the project was arranged by the European Council in cooperation with the Washington headquarters.

Since publicity was essential for the success of the Balkan report, Butler recommended that its authors be selected from among Europe’s academic, political and diplomatic elites. In order to make an impact on public opinion, it was necessary to

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appoint representatives who commanded sufficient influence and authority in their respective fields. While the proposed commission members were generally affiliated with either the Hague Conferences or the arbitration movement, Butler specifically requested that “professional pacifists,” like Henri La Fontaine and Alfred Fried, not be selected for the investigation. As head of the Balkan Commission, Butler chose his long-term friend Baron d’Estournelles de Constant. Through his diplomatic service in Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire, d’Estournelles acquired significant expertise on Balkan affairs. But d’Estournelles was best known for his contributions to international peace and the judicial settlement of disputes. A delegate to both Hague Conferences and a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in 1909, together with the Belgian internationalist Auguste Beernaert, he received the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his role in educating public opinion about the importance of international arbitration. Since 1907, he cooperated with Butler in the management of the Association for International Conciliation which was essentially a prototype of the Division of Intercourse and Education at the Carnegie Endowment. Through the publication of pamphlets, the exchange of university students and the organization of scholarly lectures, the Association sought to create a public sentiment favourable to international

135 In his autobiography, Butler writes that he met d’Estournelles at the First Hague Conference in 1899. Butler attended as an advisor to the American delegation, while d’Estournelles was a member of the French delegation. Since then, the two established close cooperation in the field of international arbitration. See: Butler, Across the Busy Years II, 88.
137 D’Estournelles established the European branch of the Association in 1905. Two years later, Butler became President of the American branch, while Andrew Carnegie was an Honorary President. See: Butler, Across the Busy Years II, 88; and Baron d’Estournelles de Constant, Program of the Association for International Conciliation (New York: American Branch of the Association for International Conciliation, 1907), 7.
conciliation. After the establishment of the Carnegie Endowment in 1910, the Association continued to publish its pamphlet series, while the rest of its activities were taken over by the Division of Intercourse and Education.\(^{138}\)

D’Estournelles cooperated with Butler in the selection of names and personally appointed members to the Commission. Originally, Butler proposed representatives from Germany, Austria, France, Britain and the United States.\(^{139}\) He hoped to create the impression that the Great Powers were impartial to the Balkan Wars. Butler argued that in order to “silence the jingoes,” it was absolutely necessary to appoint a “thoroughly competent Republican, both of Germany and of Austria,” to the Commission.\(^{140}\) He was likely referring to European attitudes regarding the possibility of military confrontation between Austria-Hungary and Russia as a result of the Balkan crisis. The wars of 1912-1913 were, in part, provoked by European diplomatic intrigues, particularly the Bosnian crisis of 1908 and its aftermath. Austria’s annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 put a strain on its relationship with Russia, since it violated an earlier agreement between the two powers for preserving the status quo in the region. The event also fuelled Balkan nationalism and led the Serbian government, which was planning to incorporate Bosnia into its borders, to demand territorial compensation. Public opinion in Russia, which was traditionally supportive of the nationalistic movements of the South Slavs, favoured intervention in the event of further Austrian incursions into the Balkans. Since the wars of

\(^{138}\) Butler, *Across the Busy Years II*, 88.


1912-1913 threatened to disturb the imperial balance of power, the possibility of European conflict seemed imminent.\(^{141}\)

Despite the efforts of the Division of Intercourse and Education to convey a sense of unity among the European powers in the face of the Balkan conflict, the history of the Carnegie Commission provides a clear illustration of the crisis in international relations on the eve of World War I. With the exception of d’Estournelles and the English journalist Francis Hirst, none of the individuals who were originally chosen by Butler were willing to participate in the investigation. The American Professor John Dyneley Prince had made “political engagements” during the scheduled time for travel,\(^{142}\) while the German Philipp Zorn and the Austrian Heinrich Lammasch declined due to an illness which, as Butler suspected, was “diplomatic” rather than real.\(^{143}\) Lammasch refused to recommend a substitute for his position, arguing that the Austrian government was “an interested party” in the Balkan Wars and could not send an impartial investigator.\(^{144}\) Although he agreed to appoint members to the Commission and to coordinate its work, d’Estournelles suggested that he should not travel to the Balkans, partly as a result of his activities in the French Senate, and also due to a personal conflict with King Nicholas of Montenegro which could cause the Commission to be rejected.\(^{145}\)

Under these circumstances, it was necessary to look for commission members who were confident in their ability to participate in the investigation despite its political

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\(^{142}\) CEIP archives, Vol. 121, Series III B, Box 467, “John D. Prince to Nicholas Butler,” August 1, 1913.


\(^{144}\) CEIP archives, Vol. 200, “d’Estournelles to Butler,” August 1, 1913.

\(^{145}\) Ibid. Although d’Estournelles is rather vague about the nature of his disagreement with King Nicholas, he writes that the conflict arose as a result of him calling the monarch a “pirate” in a public statement.
ramifications. Butler insisted that the appointment of representatives from Germany and Austria was of strategic importance for the success of the Report.\textsuperscript{146} D’Estournelles suggested that professor Wilhelm Paszkowski, a correspondent of the Division of Intercourse and Education from Berlin, would be a suitable replacement for Philipp Zorn.\textsuperscript{147} Paszkowski was the author of the Carnegie Endowment report on Germany’s international affairs in 1913, which analyzed the effects of the Balkan Wars on European politics, and thus had considerable knowledge of the situation.\textsuperscript{148} As for Austria, Butler appointed the scholar and statesman Joseph Redlich.\textsuperscript{149} Redlich was a law professor at the University of Vienna and a Liberal representative in the Imperial Reichsrat who had considerable knowledge of Hapsburg policy in the Balkans. He was the editor of a collection of memoirs by the politician Joseph Baernreither which dealt specifically with the significance of Balkan affairs for Austro-Hungarian politics prior to the outbreak of the Great War.\textsuperscript{150}

Since d’Estournelles was unwilling to accompany the Commission on its trip, he took up the task of finding a French member who was “distinguished for [his] moral and intellectual worth.”\textsuperscript{151} He appointed Justin Godart, a Deputy from Lyons and a member of the Institute of International Law.\textsuperscript{152} D’Estournelles knew Godart personally and appointed him as a result of his reliability and diligence. As Godart had no expertise in

\textsuperscript{147} CEIP archives, Vol. 200, “d’Estournelles to Butler,” August 1, 1913.
\textsuperscript{149} CEIP archives, Vol. 200, “Butler to d’Estournelles,” July 31, 1913.
\textsuperscript{151} CEIP archives, Vol. 200, “d’Estournelles to Butler,” August 1, 1913.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
Balkan affairs, he was mostly entrusted with administrative duties and became the Balkan Commission’s reporter, secretary and treasurer.\textsuperscript{153} The Commission also required the presence of a distinguished American representative in order to guarantee that its report would receive a high level of publicity in the United States. Shortly after Prince had announced his inability to participate in the investigation, Butler contacted the David Jayne Hill, an experienced diplomat who was also a well-known figure in American political life.\textsuperscript{154} Despite Butler’s hopes, Hill was unavailable and he finally appointed professor Samuel Train Dutton of Columbia University.

Unlike Prince or Hill, Dutton had little experience in foreign affairs and lacked “technical qualifications,” such as linguistic skills, but he commanded much influence among intellectual circles in the United States and expressed great enthusiasm for the investigation when Butler approached him with the subject.\textsuperscript{155} In addition to his scholarly career as Director of Teachers’ College at Columbia University, Dutton also made significant contributions to the arbitration movement in the United States. He was a frequent delegate at the Lake Mohonk Conferences, where he made connections with influential peace advocates, including the leaders of the Carnegie Endowment. Dutton also served as President of the American Peace Society and became a trustee of the World Peace Foundation. In 1906, together with other influential members of Lake Mohonk, he established the Peace Society of the City of New York, of which Andrew Carnegie later became President. As secretary of the Society, he played a key role in

\textsuperscript{153} CEIP archives, Vol. 200, “d’Estournelles to Butler,” August 6, 1913.
organizing and coordinating the First National Arbitration and Peace Congress in New York where Carnegie was appointed Commander of the French Legion of Honour in recognition of his generous donations to the Peace Palace at the Hague.  

Through his activities on behalf of the Peace Society, Dutton contributed to the consolidation of the American peace movement. He was an outspoken advocate for the establishment of a National Council of Arbitration which would coordinate the activities of the existing pacifist groups and promote educational work. In 1908, he cooperated with Hamilton Holt, Edwin Mead and Nicholas Butler in drafting the initial proposal to Carnegie for the establishment of the Endowment for International Peace. Apart from his preoccupation with international arbitration, Butler also favoured Dutton’s membership in the Commission as a result of the latter’s keen interest in the Balkans. Upon the invitation of Professor Mary Mills Patrick, Dutton became affiliated with the American College for Girls in Constantinople. In 1903, he took an active part in the Committee responsible for transforming the institution, which had hitherto been sponsored by the American Board for Foreign Missionaries, into an independent college, and joined its Board of Trustees several years later.  

Dutton’s involvement in the College, and his general interest in promoting a Western style of education in the Balkans, were inspired by a sense of Christian duty and a desire to contribute to the moral and cultural uplifting of underdeveloped countries. Prior to his appointment to the Carnegie Commission, he had little knowledge of the political or economic situation in South-East Europe, except that the region was lagging

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157 Ibid., 87-92.
158 Ibid., 75-78.
behind the West in its development. His attitude towards the Balkans rested on a preconceived notion of economic and cultural backwardness. Dutton’s first visit to the American College in 1909 was a memorable “introduction to the anomalies of the Near East.” The rudeness of customs officials and the primitive modes of transportation in the imperial capital represented a stark contrast with the luxury which Dutton had experienced during his journey through Western Europe. He was astonished not so much by the cultural and historical legacy of Constantinople, but by the fact that the streets of the city were unpaved and covered in deep hollows and ruts. In his memoirs, he described a walk up a muddy hill in the city on a rainy evening together with Mrs. Dutton as one of the most amusing events in his entire life. The experience in the Ottoman Empire served as a confirmation of the lack of civilization in the Balkans and influenced the opinion which he later expressed towards the nature of the conflicts and the conduct of the belligerents.

Appointing the Dissenters: Pavel Miliukov and Henry Brailsford

The appointment of commission members proved to be more challenging than Butler and d’Estournelles had expected. While preparations for departure were already under way, Hirst announced that he would be unable to travel to the Balkans. d’Estournelles decided that a suitable replacement in that case would be the English journalist Henry Noel Brailsford who had visited the region in the past and possessed considerable knowledge of the current situation. Given the uncertainty of the Austrian, 

159 Ibid., 103.
160 Ibid., 105.
161 Although Hirst did not travel to the Balkans, he participated in the preliminary meetings which took place in Paris and received credit for the preparation of the report. There is no record on file indicating his
German and American members to participate in the investigation, d'Estournelles also proposed that a representative from Russia should join the Balkan Commission. Upon recommendation by the prominent sociologist and liberal politician Maxim Kovalevsky, who was invited to participate in the inquiry but declined due to an illness, he appointed the historian and leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, Pavel Miliukov. The appointment of Brailsford and Miliukov to the Balkan Commission is significant for two reasons. As the only representatives who were familiar with the independence movements in the Balkans and the decline of the Ottoman Empire, they provided a valuable perspective on the territorial aspirations of the belligerents and the significance of the conflicts for international politics. In addition, both Brailsford and Miliukov advocated liberal political ideas which ultimately influenced the perspective of the Carnegie Report on the origins of the wars and the future of the Balkans.

The attitudes of Brailsford and Miliukov towards Balkan affairs, as well as their general political views, converged on many points. A decade prior to the appointment of the Carnegie Commission, the two men came into contact as a result of their common interest in Greek and South Slav nationalism and support for Russian constitutionalism. They initially exchanged ideas on the Macedonian question during Miliukov’s visit to London in 1903. Brailsford, who was a competent authority on the subject, helped Miliukov to prepare for his upcoming scholarly lectures in the United States. As a

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member of the London-based Society of Friends of Russian Freedom, Brailsford made connections with many prominent leaders of the Russian revolution, including Prince Peter Kropotkin, Felix Volkhovsky and Ivan Maisky.\textsuperscript{164} The struggle against Tsarism was one of many progressive ideas which he championed. Inspired by a sense of idealism and humanitarianism, Brailsford also advocated animal rights, women’s suffrage, arms limitation and international peace. His journalistic work reflected a strong support for the emancipation of nations under colonial rule. Prior to 1914, he frequently published articles on behalf of the Irish, Macedonians, Armenians, Persians and Egyptians. His belief that political freedom and cultural self-expression were prerequisites to a peaceful international community led him to reject imperialism and the rivalry between the Great Powers.\textsuperscript{165}

As a journalist, Brailsford promoted dissident political views and expressed opposition to the imperialist policies of the British government. He believed that Britain must abandon isolationism and balance-of-power diplomacy in favour of a Concert of Europe which would guarantee international understanding and restrain the advances of aggressive capitalists. Imperialism not only involved Britain in unnecessary diplomatic entanglements, but it also resulted in the oppression of “small peoples,” thus creating obstacles to international peace. According to Brailsford, the British government should lend support to young nations which are dedicated to the establishment of democratic institutions, instead of promoting the self-serving interests of the Great Powers. It was precisely the unwillingness of Liberal politicians to adopt an alternative method of

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 92-93.
conducting foreign affairs which led Brailsford to reject the policies of the Campbell-Bannerman cabinet. In 1905, he criticized the appointment of Sir Edward Grey as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs due to the latter’s tendency to perpetuate the traditional balance-of-power approach established by his predecessors. In addition to criticizing Grey’s unwillingness to deplore King Leopold’s depredations in the Congo, Brailsford also opposed the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. He was especially critical of the 1906 Anglo-French loan to the Russian government, since it allowed the Tsar to dismiss the Duma with “defiance and contempt.” By hindering the cause of Russian constitutionalists, the Liberal government allowed itself to become an accomplice to Tsarist tyranny and oppression.166

Brailsford’s interest in Balkan nationalism was similarly inspired by his rejection of despotism and support for political and cultural self-determination. As a member of the Philhellenic Legion, he fought in the war for the liberation of Crete from Ottoman rule in 1897. While the experience shattered his youthful idealism and contributed to his permanent distaste for militarism and the brutalities of war, it also deepened his concern for the plight of Balkan Christians and convinced him of the necessity to organize a European diplomatic intervention on their behalf. Prior to his appointment to the Carnegie Commission, he visited the Balkans several times, both as a foreign correspondent and a relief agent. In 1898, he returned to Crete as a reporter on the European naval blockade. He deplored the actions of the Great Powers, arguing that they sacrificed the interests of “defenceless people” for the sake of imperialist advances.167

The brutal suppression of the Ilinden uprising by the Ottomans in 1903 sparked his

166 Ibid., 93-95.
167 Ibid., 35.
activism on behalf of Macedonian independence. He became a member of the Balkan Committee, an organization founded by the politicians Noel Buxton and James Bryce for the purpose of influencing government action on behalf of the South Slavs. An ideological descendant of the 1876 Bulgarian agitation, the Committee, which drew support from Liberal politicians, Radical journalists and academics, accused England for restoring Turkish rule in Macedonia and insisted that the British government must put diplomatic pressure on the Sultan to introduce reforms which would benefit the Christian subjects of his empire.  

During that year, Brailsford also joined the Macedonian Relief Committee, a charitable group which distributed humanitarian aid to villages devastated by Ottoman violence. Brailsford and his wife were assigned to the province of Monastir where they were responsible for providing funds, food and medical care to families in need. Through his interactions with local residents, Brailsford acquired first-hand knowledge of the injustices suffered under the authority of Ottoman rulers and of the brutality of bandits. Three years later, the experience provoked him to write the book *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future* which combined an ethnographic account of the province with an analysis of the harsh reality suffered by its inhabitants. In discussing the physical features and national characters of Macedonia’s inhabitants, Brailsford made a distinction between Christians and Muslims and also between the Greek and Slavic races. While he ascribed some oriental qualities to Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs, such as physical appearance, dress, propensity for violence and lack of civilization, he also emphasized the distinctions between them, including religion, language and cultural rituals. Brailsford

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168 Ibid., 49.
169 Ibid., 50-52.
linked the peasants’ capacity for progress with features of national character. For example, he maintained that, as “pleasure loving people” who had an “excitable disposition,” the Serbians were less capable of achieving material progress than the Bulgarians. Although the Bulgarians had not experienced political freedom for a long period of time, they made more significant economic progress due to their “power of continuous work,” “indifference to pain” and “resolute stolidity.” Brailsford also encountered differences between the physical features of Serbians and Bulgarians. Based on his personal observations, he concluded that while Bulgarians were “strong, sturdy and enduring,” their features were unappealing and even children appeared “rather ugly.” By contrast, Serbians were “tall and well-built” and appeared “handsome in feature.”

In addition to describing the interactions between the various ethnic and religious groups, Macedonia also exposed the ineffectiveness of reforms introduced as a result of the Mürzsteg Agreement by presenting evidence of the lawlessness, neglect for the needs of local inhabitants and tyranny at the hands of landlords. Brailsford argued that since the Crimean War, Europe had succeeded at imposing upon the Turks only an “illusory pretence of civilization.” With their stubborn resistance to reform and modernization, Ottoman rulers perpetuated ancient traditions in government which put the interests of the dynastic elites above those of ordinary people. Since the conqueror was considered superior to his subjects, the Christian inhabitants of the empire were denied political rights and were treated with hostility and distrust. As a result of the authorities’ self-serving attitude, the Macedonian countryside resembled a “desert swept by a human

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171 Ibid., 15.
172 Ibid., 23.
hurricane” in the aftermath of the Ilinden revolt. In addition to the devastated households, the complete disregard for public hygiene and the absence of hospitals, schools, roads and railways made it seem as if the province was on the fringes of civilization.

By exposing the plight of Christian peasants under Ottoman rule, *Macedonia* made an appeal for European intervention in the Balkans. In the final chapter of the book, Brailsford drafted a scheme for the political future of the region. Since the partition of Macedonia by the Balkan states or the declaration of autonomy would most likely meet the Sultan’s disapproval and lead to further conflict and bloodshed, Brailsford proposed that the province should be governed by a Board of Delegates selected from the Five Protecting Powers. Administrative reform was necessary in order to eliminate the deficiencies of the system established by the Mürzsteg Agreement. Brailsford suggested that the representatives of each European power should take charge of a separate ministry based on their expertise. He further proposed that in order to avoid the issue of resentment by the Ottoman ruling elites over diminishing their authority, a Turkish Governor General should be made subordinate to the International Board. Since he would be appointed and dismissed directly by the European authorities, rather than the Sultan, the Governor General would be less likely to abuse his power and have greater incentive to serve the interests of the local population.

Pavel Miliukov, the Russian member of the Balkan Commission, was similarly a dissenter among his peers in politics and academia. Early in his career as a scholar, he

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173 Inid., 39.
174 Ibid., 21.
175 Ibid., 320-332.
developed a conception of history which differed significantly from the dominant Slavophile school of thought. Inspired by the writings of Auguste Comté and Herbert Spencer, Miliukov subscribed to the theory of positivism and became interested in studying the past from a sociological perspective. He believed that while historical processes were governed by universal laws, they were also subject to circumstantial factors. In addition to structural and accidental conditions, such as the climate, the environment and the presence of hostile neighbours, society’s development was also influenced by human will and action. Unlike Spencer, who discussed social evolution as an unconscious process, Miliukov’s sociological analysis also incorporated the role of the individual. The laws and regularities which governed the historical process operated alongside conscious human action, but its sphere of influence was limited. Miliukov’s early historical works clearly illustrate this view. In his book entitled *The State Economy of Russia in the First Quarter of the Eighteenth Century*, he attempted to clear the debate between Slavophiles and Westernizer over Peter the Great’s “betrayal” of Russian traditions. Miliukov took a somewhat ambivalent view of Peter’s accomplishments, arguing that while the Tsar’s reforms were a necessary step in Russia’s development as a modern empire, they were carried out at the expense of the people’s welfare, thus showing his distaste for autocracy.176

Miliukov’s most influential work, *Outlines of Russian Culture*, was published as a three-volume study which explored the development of material and spiritual culture and the origins of the “national idea” and public opinion in his native country. Organized thematically rather than chronologically, *Outlines* sought to explain Russia’s present in

terms of the past. Moreover, by discussing the dynamics between internal developments and external factors, the goal of the book was to demonstrate that Russian history was both unique and similar to the rest of Europe. In his analysis of Russia’s political institutions, Miliukov argued that a major distinction from the West was the development of the state system from the top down, rather than from the bottom up. Whereas in Europe the landed aristocracy had distinct interests from those of the state, which gave birth to the idea of political freedom, in Russia, under the influence of difficult economic conditions, the state developed as a military camp which incorporated every social order into its service. Another difference between Russia and Western Europe was the failure of the Orthodox Church to penetrate the masses and exert influence on the development of art and literature. Lacking a secular tradition of its own, Russian culture borrowed inspiration from external sources and imitated foreign ways. This argument was a bold rejection of the traditional Slavophile conception of Russian religiosity which dominated the existing historiography. Finally, the development of Russia’s “national idea” was the result of both external threats and internal struggles. Russian absolutism was ideologically influenced by the West and adapted to the local context in order to harness the country’s social and economic forces.\textsuperscript{177}

As a result of his early activities as a scholar, Miliukov came under the scrutiny of censorship authorities. In addition to delivering public lectures which dealt with controversial subjects, such as the decline of Slavophilism and the Russian revolutionary movement, he was also implicated in exerting a “harmful influence” on students by publishing an illegal pamphlet on behalf of the Narodniki.\textsuperscript{178} In late 1896, Miliukov was

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 69-73.
\textsuperscript{178} Riha, \textit{A Russian European}, 22-27.
sentenced to two years in exile abroad which he spent as a Professor of Slavic history at the University of Sofia, Bulgaria. Miliukov’s experience in Bulgaria had a significant impact on his future political career. It laid the foundations of his preoccupation with Balkan nationalism and foreign affairs and it also provided him with a valuable lesson about the possible success of a constitutional regime in a young democracy. Miliukov established connections within the Bulgarian intelligentsia and liberal activists through which he acquired first-hand knowledge of domestic politics. The experience served as a confirmation that if constitutionalism could function in a backward country like Bulgaria, which lacked long-term democratic traditions, it could certainly succeed in Russia as well.

During that time, Miliukov also took an archaeological expedition in Macedonia which helped him become acquainted with the local struggle for sovereignty. Through his interactions with the locals, he learned about the rivalry between different ethnic groups, which often resulted in violent clashes, and about the desperate hopes of some Bulgarian Macedonians that Russia would intervene militarily on their behalf. Several years later, Miliukov published an ethnographic atlas of Macedonia which, similar to Brailsford’s book, described the aspirations of the disputants in the Ottoman province.179 Unlike Brailsford, Miliukov’s perspective on the Balkans was not informed by evolutionism. As a result of common ancestry and similarity in culture and religion, Russian paternalism and sympathy for the suffering of Christians under Ottoman rule emerged as a substitute to Western European contempt for the inferior Slavs. Like many Russian intellectuals, Miliukov supported the emancipation movements in the Ottoman Empire, but he was

179 Ibid., 35-36.
cautious about recommending Russian military intervention in the Balkans. His attitude, which is clearly expressed in the Carnegie Report, was characterized by paternalism and a feeling of superiority which emerged from the fact that, as an empire, Russia was more advanced than any other Slavic nation and was, therefore, a legitimate member of the “civilized world.”

Following his return to Russia, Miliukov settled in St. Petersburg where he entered the ranks of the political opposition. He became the editor of the Marxist journal *Mir Bozhii*, which published his *Outlines of Russian Culture* as a series, and also joined the Writers’ Union and the Free Economic Society, the two chief bases of the capital’s radical intelligentsia. Although he had connections with both Marxists and Populists, Miliukov did not identify with either of these groups and, eventually, he gravitated towards the zemstvo Liberals which represented the vanguard of the Russian liberal movement. Upon the invitation of the zemstvo leader Ivan Petrunkevich, he took over the editorship of the clandestine Liberal journal *Osvobozhdenie*. In the first issue of *Osvobozhdenie*, Miliukov outlined the program of the future Constitutional Democratic Party which called for the elimination of autocracy, the establishment of a democratically elected legislature, freedom of speech and equality of all citizens before the law. The program was specifically developed to guarantee the establishment of Russian democratic institutions without recourse to a revolution. It was also designed to attract the segment of Russia’s population which did not identify itself with either the socialists or the conservatives and searched for a middle ground instead.

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181 Riha, *A Russian European*, 42.
Miliukov’s subsequent career at the Duma was characterized by a cautious approach towards both domestic and international affairs and an emphasis upon moderation in all political issues. He was one of the few Constitutional Democrats who believed that their party should become involved in the debates about Russia’s foreign policy. A strong position on international relations, he argued, would not only make the Kadets appear more patriotic, but it would also make an impact on public opinion abroad. By 1908, Miliukov had established himself as the Duma’s foreign policy expert, specializing in Balkan affairs. The subject was a natural choice for him, given his knowledge of the region, and also as a result of the contentious nature of the Balkan question in recent times. Miliukov’s views on the Balkans, and his general attitude towards Russia’s foreign policy, differed significantly from those of his peers. He shared the belief of some fellow Kadets that Russia should gravitate towards France and Britain and supported the signing of the Anglo-Russian convention in 1907. However, Miliukov differed from other politicians in his assessment of Russia’s role in the Balkans. He argued that while Russia should protect its interests in the region, it must not give in to Austria’s provocations in order to avoid a military confrontation.

In the aftermath of the Bosnian Crisis, many leaders of public opinion in Russia advocated the adoption of an aggressive foreign policy in the Balkans as an attempt to regain the country’s prestige after the diplomatic humiliation. Miliukov cautioned against this approach, arguing that uncritical support for Slav interests, especially those of Serbia, would embroil Russia in an unnecessary war against its imperial rival which it was not prepared to fight. His views on Balkan nationalism differed from the mainstream

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182 Stockdale, Paul Miliukov, 209-210; Riha, A Russian European, 165
183 Stockdale, Paul Miliukov, 211.
opinion which maintained that Russia should intervene on behalf of the South Slavs and guide them towards political independence. Based on the observations which he gathered through his acquaintances in Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia, Miliukov concluded that the Balkan nations had outgrown Russian tutelage and were capable of achieving political independence without help from outside, especially since the nationalist movement had passed from the populists into the hands of the young generation of democratic intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{184} He rejected the ideas of Pan-Slavism and supported the establishment of a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance which would put an end to the conflict over Macedonia and also serve as a barrier against Austrian expansion. He also expressed great enthusiasm for the Young Turk regime, claiming that the progressive reforms which it promised to implement in Macedonia would be preferable to the establishment of the province’s autonomy or federalization.\textsuperscript{185}

Thus, prior to their appointment to the Balkan Commission, Miliukov and Brailsford expressed similar views on the Macedonian question and the political future of the Balkans. In addition to their foreign policy perspectives, the two men also shared an idealistic belief in pacifism and the decline of militarism as the guiding principle of European politics. Their writings on international relations and the future of the arms race reflect the blind optimism characteristic of pre-World War I peace activists. Miliukov, who was a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the St. Petersburg Society of Peace, was inspired by the writings of two very influential political economists, Jan Gotlich Bloch and Norman Angell.\textsuperscript{186} Bloch made an appeal for pacifism based on the

\textsuperscript{184} Riha, \textit{A Russian European}, 169.
\textsuperscript{186} Miliukov, \textit{Political Memoirs}, 190.
enormous human and material losses which resulted from military conflicts, as well as
the heavy costs of modern armaments.\textsuperscript{187} In his famous book \textit{The Great Illusion}, Angell
also pointed out that the heavy expenditures towards war could devastate the modern
credit-based economies. He believed that, due to the efforts of peace activists,
governments would voluntarily reject war due to its economic unprofitability.\textsuperscript{188}

Miliukov’s intellectual contribution to the international peace movement, \textit{The Armed
World and the Limitations of Armaments}, drew heavily on Angell’s thesis. Miliukov
advocated a “realistic” form of pacifism, arguing that gradual disarmament would only be
possible if public opinion was educated about the necessity to maintain peace.\textsuperscript{189}

Brailsford was similarly inspired by Angell’s ideas, although he never fully
subscribed to them. The realization that war was unviable and obsolete did not, in itself,
justify complacency about the prospects of peace. It was essential to make the public
aware of the fact that the economic self-interest of a powerful minority was the driving
force behind the European arms race. Brailsford’s book \textit{The War of Steel and Gold} is a
reflection of his growing sympathy for socialism and rejection of the capitalist system.
He argued that on the eve of World War I, Europe was facing a paradoxical situation:
although civilized public opinion deplored war, armaments were increasing.
Governments were cautiously trying to avoid a military confrontation though diplomacy,
and yet they were also expanding their armies and navies.\textsuperscript{190} According to Brailsford, the

\begin{footnotes}
Technical, Economic and Political Relations,”} (London: Grant Richards, 1899), xv-xxxii.
\item[188] Norman Angell, \textit{The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage}
\item[189] Stockdale, \textit{Paul Miliukov}, 212.
\item[190] Henry Noel Brailsford, \textit{The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace} (London: G. Bell &
Sons, Ltd., 1918), 16. The book was originally published in 1908.
\end{footnotes}
arms race was the result of a desire to maintain the balance of power between the imperial rivals, rather than of an actual military threat. He argued that the Great Powers were not interested in invading their neighbours’ frontiers, since questions of national honour, liberty and nationality were no longer relevant to them, and a future war was thus very unlikely.\textsuperscript{191} The accumulation of weapons and military expenditure in recent times were a natural consequence of the competition for colonial expansion overseas and the absorption of economically underdeveloped regions. Strong armies and navies enhanced the prestige of empires and drove their rivals away from untapped markets. Only the advance of socialism could put an end to the arms race as a result of the rejection of militarism and imperialism which was inherent in its ideology.\textsuperscript{192}

**The Carnegie Commission’s Tour of the Balkans**

D’Estournelles announced the appointment of the Balkan Commission on July 18.\textsuperscript{193} The group met in Paris on the following day to set an itinerary and to discuss the objectives of the inquiry, and afterwards, it proceeded to Belgrade by way of Vienna and Budapest.\textsuperscript{194} Although all necessary preparations had been made and the representatives, except for Hirst, announced their readiness to go, the Commission encountered challenges which prevented it from carrying out its objectives as planned. The Austrian and German governments unexpectedly refused to issue travel documents to Redlich and Paszkowski, so the investigation had to proceed without them.\textsuperscript{195} In the absence of a

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 35-41.  
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 195.  
\textsuperscript{194} Levermore, *Samuel T. Dutton*, 121.  
German member, d’Estournelles decided to appoint Professor Walther Schücking of the University of Marburg who was a distinguished international lawyer and an outspoken advocate for the establishment of a permanent League of Nations based on the Hague Conferences. But, partly due to the efforts of the Serbian government to obstruct the work of the Carnegie Commission, and also as a result of miscommunication, Schücking was unable to participate in the investigation. Upon reaching Belgrade after the rest of the Commission had already departed for Greece, government officials informed him that the inquiry had failed and it was abandoned. Nevertheless, Schücking was determined to catch up with the rest of the group and arrived at Salonica where, having once again found himself alone and possibly discouraged by hostile authorities, he informed d’Estournelles about his intention to return home. Butler later commented that as an American, he was greatly disappointed by the European governments’ efforts to restrict the “academic freedom” of Redlich and Paszkowski and by the fact that Schücking was so easily discouraged, but despite his lamentations, the Commission continued without Austrian and German representatives.

Although d’Estournelles had informed the press and the governments of the Balkan nations about the arrival of the Carnegie Commission, its members encountered significant resistance by the Serbian and Greek authorities in their efforts to obtain official statements about the causes and results from the wars. In Belgrade, Prime

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198 CEIP archives, Vol. 200, “d’Estournelles to Butler,” September 6, 1913. D’Estournelles accidentally told Butler that Schücking contacted him from Colon rather than Salonica. He was likely confused by the fact that in Greek and in the Slavic languages, the name of the city is pronounced as “Solon” (“Çolon”), hence the error.
Minister Nikola Pašić refused to acknowledge the presence of the Commission on account of Miliukov’s participation. Without proper explanation, Miliukov was declared an enemy of Serbia, most likely as a result of his pro-Bulgarian attitude and also because of the position which he expressed at the Duma regarding the Bosnian Crisis. While he was dining at a restaurant in the Serbian capital, Miliukov even became the target of a protest organized by a group of students who, however, were quickly discouraged by his colleagues. The members of the Commission evidently did not expect such a reaction and held a meeting at which they decided that it would be best to ignore the provocations and proceed to Salonica. The reaction they encountered in Greece was both friendly and hostile at the same time. In an effort to impress the visitors, the Governor of Salonica, Stefanos Dragoumis, cordially welcomed Justin Godart into his office and expressed his willingness to facilitate the investigation. Meanwhile, the government in Athens denounced Brailsford who, like Miliukov, was accused of partiality towards Bulgaria. Brailsford’s recent articles deplored Greek advances in Macedonia during the Balkan Wars. In addition, he wrote that Macedonian peasants were of either Bulgarian or Serbian background and that Greek claims to the province were completely unjustified. Of all the disputants, Bulgaria was the only power which secured the support of the local population because of the strong linguistic, ethnic and religious bonds and the successful political propaganda. These arguments evidently did not appeal to the Greek

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200 As mentioned earlier, Miliukov questioned Russian support for Serbian interests during that time. See: Stockdale, Paul Miliukov, 211.
201 Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 257.
204 Leventhal, The Last Dissenter, 106.
205 Brailsford, Macedonia, 101-107.
government which, as an enemy of Bulgaria, automatically denounced the country’s sympathizer.

While the Carnegie Commission was touring the sites of war, Greek and Serbian newspapers initiated a propaganda campaign whose purpose was to discredit the investigation. Brailsford was accused of distributing relief to Bulgarians in Macedonia and of making offensive statements about Greece.\(^{206}\) Other sources claimed that the Commission was serving the interests of Bulgaria and that its purpose was to conceal the crimes perpetrated by Tsar Ferdinand’s army.\(^{207}\) In addition, both Serbian and Greek newspapers announced that the inquiry had been abandoned while it was actually still in progress. Upon receiving this false information from the *New York Sun*, Butler immediately ordered a press release declaring that the mission was being successfully carried out.\(^{208}\) Since the Greek government refused to supply the members of the Carnegie Commission with an official statement about the origins of the wars, they collected information from refugees, foreign missionaries and officers of the American Tobacco Company in Seres and Kavalla.\(^{209}\) The Governor of Salonica issued an order to the Commission to leave the city on account of Brailsford’s and Miliukov’s presence.\(^{210}\)

At this point, the group started to debate whether it might be best to return to Paris and appoint new representatives for the investigation, but upon Dutton’s insistence, they decided to continue. After agreeing on the composition of the future report, Miliukov and

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\(^{206}\) Leventhal, *The Last Dissenter*, 106.

\(^{207}\) CEIP archives, Vol. 200, “Annex to the Letter of Mr. Justin Godart. Translation of an Article Published in the Greek Newspaper “Chrons.”” August 28, 1913.


Godart left for Athens, while Brailsford and Dutton toured the Greek and Macedonian countryside.\textsuperscript{211}

Of all the commissioners, Dutton appears to have been the most enthusiastic about the project and the least likely to be discouraged by the challenges he faced. He saw the investigation as a humanitarian mission and an opportunity to learn more about the social and economic conditions in the Balkans which seem to have been of great interest to him. Although he felt like the experience took him to the “brinks of hell,” Dutton was the most persistent member of the entire group in his efforts to obtain the necessary evidence for the report.\textsuperscript{212} While in Salonica, he mostly communicated with other foreigners who were involved in various educational and civilizing projects, such as French and American teachers and priests and the principle of the Thessalonika Agricultural Institute which was “one of the most beneficent enterprises in the region.”\textsuperscript{213} When the government authorities finally granted Dutton the necessary travel documents and provided him with a dragoman, he travelled to Seres, Drama, Doxato and Kavalla where he met with notable citizens and officials. In Seres, the city’s “leading banker” organized a cordial reception at his house, possibly as an attempt to please Dutton and convince him about the veracity of Greek statements about Bulgarian atrocities. Meanwhile, Brailsford, who was denied a travel permit by the authorities twice in a row, finally reached Kukush on September 8 to collect testimony from the local population.\textsuperscript{214}

Shortly after his arrival in Athens, Miliukov learned from the press about the government’s hostility to his presence and decided to travel to Constantinople while

\textsuperscript{211} Levermore, \textit{Samuel T. Dutton}, 126-128.
\textsuperscript{212} CEIP archives, Vol. 121, “Dutton to Butler,” September 20, 1913.
\textsuperscript{213} Levermore, \textit{Samuel T. Dutton}, 128.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid., 129-131.
Godart, Dutton and Brailsford remained in Greece. Unlike the Serbians and the Greeks, Ottoman authorities were very cooperative and provided Miliukov with all the necessary assistance and support. Upon investigating conditions in Adrianople, he discovered that Greek claims about Bulgarian atrocities were grossly exaggerated and that all of the belligerents shared equal responsibility for the city’s devastation.\footnote{Miliukov, \textit{Political Memoirs}, 260-262.} On September 13, the four members of the Commission reunited in Sofia where they completed the final stage of the investigation.\footnote{The date corresponds to August 31 O.S., as mentioned in Miliukov’s memoirs. Miliukov, \textit{Political Memoirs}, 263.} The Bulgarian authorities organized the friendliest and most helpful reception. A government delegation awaited Miliukov’s arrival at the train station and went beyond their way to accommodate him. In addition, documents relating to the atrocities from the wars were prepared before the commissioners even had a chance to request them. According to Miliukov, the government acted without any prejudice or partisan feeling and looked upon the Balkan Commission’s report as “the voice of acquittal.”\footnote{Ibid., 263.} Dutton, on the other hand, interpreted the courtesy and attentiveness of Bulgarian officials as an attempt to disguise the crimes committed by their soldier during the war. He argued that a group of recently released prisoners of war, who appeared to be in good shape, were unjustified in demanding sympathy from the Commission. Nevertheless, Dutton enjoyed the hospitality of the royal family and exchanged ideas about educational projects with Queen Eleanor.\footnote{Levermore, \textit{Samuel T. Dutton}, 134-137.} After a quick tour of the Bulgarian countryside, the Commission finally arrived in Paris on September 29 to begin the preparation of the report.\footnote{CEIP archives, Vol. 200, “d’Estournelles to Butler,” September 29, 1913.}
Conclusion

The Carnegie Commission thus had limited success in carrying out its objectives. On the one hand, by appointing members who represented the intellectual and political elite of Europe and the United States, Butler managed to project the elitism which was characteristic of the philosophy of the International Mind. Although the Commission was composed of individuals with diverse backgrounds and political orientations, they all shared the condescending attitude of the Carnegie Endowment towards the “uncivilized” world. As a historian, Miliukov, for example, viewed societies’ development from an evolutionary perspective. Similarly, Brailsford believed that big, powerful nations like Britain had a paternalistic duty towards their smaller, weaker neighbours. Dutton also felt that the West had a moral obligation to civilize and enlighten the backward nations of the Balkans. However, Butler failed to guarantee the image of impartiality which was essential for the success of the Commission. Several of the members who were initially selected for the investigation refused to participate precisely because they believed that they could not express an unbiased perspective on the Balkan Wars. In addition, the Greek and Serbian accusations of impartiality obstructed the work of the Commission and prevented the collection of evidence which was necessary for the report.
Chapter III: The Carnegie Commission’s Perspective on the Balkan Wars

Upon returning to Paris, Miliukov, Brailsford, Dutton, Godart and d’Estournelles decided to analyze the atrocities from the First and Second Balkan Wars, with an emphasis on the conduct of the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian armies in Macedonia, Thrace and the Aegean. The chapters of the Report were assigned according to the knowledge and expertise of the authors. As leader of the Balkan Commission, d’Estournelles wrote the introduction in which he presented the ideas and objectives of the Report. Miliukov completed the chapters related to the history of the Balkan Wars, the siege of Adrianople and the Bulgarian offensive against Serbia, the ethnic assimilation and persecution of foreign nationalities in Macedonia, and the violations of international law. Brailsford discussed the violence against noncombatants, while Godart analyzed the economic effects of the wars. Finally, in the concluding chapter, Dutton reflected on the moral and social consequences from the conflicts.  

Although Redlich, Schücking and Hirst did not participate in the investigation, they took part in the editing and proofreading of the Report and, therefore, they received credit for its preparation. Since the Commission interpreted its work as a “collective responsibility,” none of the chapters were signed by their individual authors.

This chapter will discuss the arguments expressed in the Carnegie Report as an example of Balkanism. The Report confirms the monolithic view of the Balkans as barbaric, primitive and unable to conform to European standards of international behaviour. The Commissioners ascribed collective responsibility for the atrocities which

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took place during the Balkan Wars and made little distinction between the conduct of the various participants in the conflict. The Report also suggested that the racial heterogeneity of the Balkans was responsible for the “national jealousies” and “hatreds” which sparked the conflict. As d’Estournelles pointed out, the Balkan people were intermixed in an “inextricable confusion of languages and religions” which resulted in an ongoing struggle for domination.222 In addition to the desire to establish political hegemony, the Balkan Wars were influenced by deeply rooted “racial hatreds” which predated the arrival of the Ottomans. According to the evidence in the Report, the violence which Christian soldiers inflicted upon each other often exceeded the atrocities against Muslims. As Todorova suggests, the Balkanist discourse juxtaposes the uncivilized, violent Balkans with a positive and self-congratulatory image of the West.223 This tendency is also evident in the Report. The Commission described the extreme violence of the belligerents as evidence of the profound cultural differences between Europe and the Balkans. The systematic persecution of enemy populations, the involvement of irregular armies and the annihilation of entire towns and villages were common features of the conflict which had no equivalent in European warfare. The Commission contrasted Balkan militarism with the efforts of the “civilized world” to promote international peace, thereby showing that the conduct of the belligerents was a sign of cultural backwardness.

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223 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 188.
The History of the Balkan Wars

Pavel Miliukov’s chapter on the origins of the Balkan Wars combines elements of historical analysis with a discussion of contemporary international politics. He traced the development of the present conflict to the Middle Ages when Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece were engaged in an ongoing struggle for political and religious hegemony. As various provinces were incorporated into large multinational kingdoms, the ethnic composition of the Balkans became intermixed, thus providing the basis for the future disputes over areas like Macedonia. Although the establishment of the Ottoman Empire temporarily suppressed the territorial aspirations of the warring states, the national consciousness of their inhabitants was preserved and the strife between them was renewed during the movement for political emancipation. The restoration of the medieval kingdoms of Great Serbia and Great Bulgaria and the reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire thus became the central features of the national ideas of the Balkan states. Whereas in the past Balkan rulers made no attempts at assimilating the various ethnic groups within their domains, the goal of the new regimes was to create nation-states and to erase all traces of foreign influence. Miliukov argued that both the Church and the state were involved in this process. The conflict over Macedonia arose as a result of the schism between the Greek Patriarchy and the Bulgarian Exarchy. The voluntary incorporation of a significant part of the province into the national church of Bulgaria put an end to Greece’s religious hegemony and jeopardized its plans for territorial conquest.224

Miliukov suggested that, although initially Serbia did not show any interest in Macedonia, two main factors contributed to its eventual decision to demand the

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224 Ibid., 19-24.
annexation of the province. Due to the efforts of Austria to prevent foreign expansion in the Adriatic and the plans of the Bulgarian Church to incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia had no choice but to look for a territorial outlet in the Southern Balkans. Nationalist scholars and political leaders proclaimed Macedonia part of Old Serbia under Emperor Douchan the Great and insisted that its annexation was a historical right. Both Bulgaria and Serbia initiated propaganda campaigns in an effort to increase their influence in the area. According to Miliukov, the establishment of national schools throughout the province became an auxiliary to the policy of assimilation. Since the majority of Slavic children attended Exarchist schools, Miliukov argued that the Bulgarian government had a considerable advantage over its rival. In addition to the clergy and teachers, scholars also contributed to the popularization of nationalist propaganda. Serbian and Bulgarian ethnographic atlases published evidence of cultural and linguistic affiliation which helped legitimize the governments’ territorial demands.

In addition to attributing the origins of the Macedonian question to nationalism and “megalomania,” Miliukov also ascribed responsibility to Austrian and Russian imperialism for precipitating the dispute between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. While he admitted that secret alliances and balance-of-power diplomacy contributed to the growing instability in the region, Miliukov justified Russia’s position as a guardian of peace and a protector of South-Slav interests. He argued that the Treaty of San Stefano, which concluded the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, provided a fair territorial arrangement which eliminated the possibility of future disputes between the Balkan nations. If the agreement had not been revised at the Congress of Berlin, the Balkan Wars would have been

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avoided. Due to the diplomatic efforts of Russia, the Treaty established Bulgaria’s independence from the Ottoman Empire and granted the country full control of Macedonia and Thrace, as well as access to the Aegean. According to Miliukov, by reuniting the population of Macedonia with Bulgaria, the settlement helped maintain the “natural” distribution of nationalities in the Balkans. The Treaty of San Stefano was welcomed by the Macedonian revolutionaries, who supported the Bulgarian independence movement, and by Serbia which had hitherto made no territorial claims to the Southern Balkans. However, Austria, Germany and Britain felt threatened by the sudden increase of Russian influence in the region. At the Congress of Berlin, the Great Powers returned Macedonia and parts of Thrace to the Ottoman Empire. The territory of Bulgaria was significantly reduced in an effort to compromise the prospects for Russia’s expansion. As a result, the Balkan states renewed their dispute over the status of Macedonia and the subsequent military and political crisis was thus triggered.

Shortly after the Congress of Berlin, Austria and Russia signed two secret treaties concerning their policies in the Balkans. In 1878, Austria obtained permission to “occupy and administer” Bosnia and Herzegovina and establish a protectorate in Macedonia in the event of the province’s liberation from Ottoman rule. In exchange, Russia demanded recognition of the San Stefano boundaries, but since Austria declined, the Tsar was only able to create a sphere of influence in Bulgaria as recognized by the Berlin Treaty. According to Miliukov, Austria’s refusal to abide to the terms of the agreement aggravated the Balkan situation. Emperor Franz Joseph’s ambition to take possession of the Adriatic conflicted with the territorial aspirations of the Serbian government.

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226 Ibid., 31-32.
227 Ibid., 32.
According to a secret treaty signed in 1881, Austria reserved the right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Serbia was compensated for the loss of the Western Balkans by receiving permission to occupy Macedonia. However, the growing influence of Macedonian insurgents, who demanded the establishment of autonomy in the province, endangered the imperial policies of the Great Powers. In order to maintain control of the Balkans, Austria and Russia made another agreement which called for the preservation of the territorial status quo. While Russia refused to intervene militarily in the region, Austria violated the arrangement by seizing Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Since the Tsar did not receive an indemnity, the diplomatic relationship between the Great Powers was compromised. In addition, Serbia, which was now preparing to take over Macedonia, entered a dispute with Bulgaria.

Meanwhile, the uncertainty of Macedonia’s political future intensified the brigandage movement and resulted in violence and social unrest. Miliukov showed sympathy for the aims of the Internal Macedonian Organization which was the most prominent revolutionary group in the province. He argued that, contrary to popular belief, its leaders were fairly independent from foreign influence and their ultimate goal was autonomy, rather than incorporation into Bulgaria. He criticized both the European Powers and the Ottoman Empire for their failure to implement political and administrative reforms in Macedonia which would have prevented the outbreak of the Ilinden revolt in 1903 and the subsequent crisis. Miliukov’s disapproval of the policies of the Young Turk government represented a departure from his earlier attitude. Whereas

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228 Ibid., 26.
229 Ibid., 33.
230 Ibid., 33.
in 1908 he celebrated the advent of the regime as the only viable option for the resolution of the Macedonian question, by 1913 he was evidently disillusioned with its failure to promote stability and to guarantee the rights of the Christian subjects of the Empire.\textsuperscript{231} In the Carnegie Report, Miliukov argued that despite the promises of freedom and equality for all ethnic groups, the Young Turk government proved to be extremely “narrow and nationalistic.”\textsuperscript{232} In fact, the policies of Ottomanization and ethnic assimilation, which were intended to put an end to the rivalries between the different nationalities, were among the chief factors responsible for the outbreak of the First Balkan War. By prohibiting the existence of national schools and clubs, restricting the freedom of religious communities and organizing systematic repression against peasants and revolutionary leaders, the regime provoked the resentment of the local population and thus initiated the movement for secession. Since the Ottoman authorities were reluctant to recognize Macedonia’s autonomy, the only remaining option was to seek partition between the Balkan states.\textsuperscript{233}

Miliukov argued that the partition of Macedonia between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece was influenced by Austrian and Russian policy in the Balkans. Prior to the establishment of the Balkan League, whose aim was to liberate the province from Ottoman rule, the idea for the creation of a South-Slav union had existed for several decades. The leaders of the revolutionary intelligentsia in Serbia and Bulgaria advocated the establishment of a federation composed of independent, democratic states of which Macedonia would be an equal member. Since an alliance of this sort would inevitably

\textsuperscript{231} For a discussion of Miliukov’s attitude towards the arrival of the Young Turk regime, see: Riha, \textit{A Russian European}, 168.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., 36-37.
endanger the strategic interests of Austria and Russia, they used secret diplomacy to create discord between the Balkan states. In order to isolate Bulgaria diplomatically and prevent it from taking Macedonia, Austria made a territorial agreement with Serbia and also promoted the signing of a convention between Greece and Rumania in 1901.\footnote{Ibid.,40- 41.} In response to Austria’s diplomatic maneuvering, Russia assisted in the establishment of the Balkan League which, however, differed significantly from the union envisioned by the South Slav intelligentsia in terms of its ideas and objectives. According to Miliukov, far from being a strategic alliance which guaranteed the peaceful coexistence of the Balkan nations, the League was merely a “Russian plot” against Austrian expansion in Macedonia. By allowing the Balkan states to partition the province, the agreement created obstacles for the successful implementation of Emperor Franz Joseph’s policy. But the conflicting interests of the allies prevented them from reaching a favourable territorial agreement and the Balkan League thus fell apart.\footnote{Ibid., 41.}

During the Balkan Wars, the Russian government acted as a mediator between the allies and tried to prevent the escalation of hostilities, albeit with limited success. In 1912, Tsar Nicholas II assumed the role of an arbiter in the event of a dispute between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria over the distribution of conquered territories.\footnote{Ibid., 43.} Miliukov suggests that during the War of Liberation, all of the belligerents made strategic mistakes which eventually resulted in the outbreak of the second conflict. Upon entering Macedonia, the Serbian and Greek armies committed atrocities against the local inhabitants in an effort to assert their dominance. Bulgarian teachers and priests were driven out of the province,
while the peasant population was forced to denounce its nationality and swear allegiance to the Greek Orthodox Church. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian government neglected the suffering of its compatriots in Macedonia and focused instead on making territorial advances in Thrace and the Aegean. As Serbia began to consolidate its influence in Macedonia, it demanded a revision of the line of partition, arguing that Bulgaria had violated the agreement by refusing to lend military support to its allies. According to Miliukov, both Serbia and Bulgaria transgressed the terms of the League by making unreasonable territorial demands. Despite Russia’s insistence to seek compromise, these “perversions and megalomania of the National Ideal” prevented the allies from reaching a peaceful settlement. While the formal responsibility for initiating the Second Balkan War lies with Bulgaria, it was Serbia’s refusal to abide to the treaty of partition which ultimately led to the breakup of the Balkan League.

Responsibility for The Atrocities

In the following three chapters of the report, Miliukov and Brailsford provide a detailed chronological account of the atrocities which took place in the battlefields of Macedonia, Thrace and the Aegean during the First and Second Balkan Wars. Based on the testimony collected from eyewitnesses, the authors concluded that all of the belligerents exhibited the same degree of cruelty and violence and were thus equally responsible for the destruction of human lives and property. The evidence at the Commission’s disposal pointed out numerous cases of massacre, pillage, arson and displacement of civilian populations which represent a violation of the “European

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237 Ibid., 52-59.
238 Ibid., 60-63.
Far from being merely a narrative of events from the two wars, the Carnegie Report also offers a portrayal of Balkan civilization. According to the Commission, the tendency towards extreme violence was a cultural characteristic which separated the Balkans from the rest of Europe. The methods of warfare, which were based on a unique local tradition of vengeance, give evidence to deeply rooted “racial hatreds” and animosities. Violence occurred not only as a form of retribution against former Ottoman oppressors, but also due to the conflicts which have divided the Christian population of the peninsula since “the dawn of history.”

For the members of the Carnegie Commission, the Balkan experience offered an introduction to the concept of total war which was largely unfamiliar to the European public. As civilians became both the objects and perpetrators of violence, the military and noncombatant zones became virtually indistinguishable. Some of the most severe atrocities were committed by bands of irregular soldiers whose actions were often sanctioned by the official military command. Meanwhile, as the belligerents sought to either assimilate or completely annihilate the enemy population, towns and villages were burnt and their residents subject to severe reprisals.

The Carnegie Commission described brigandage as a distinctive feature of Balkan warfare. Driven by nationalistic fervour and a desire for revenge upon oppressive Muslim

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239 Ibid., 108.
240 Ibid., 95.
241 Prior to the Balkan Wars, the only other example of a total war in modern Europe was the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Italy. See: Vanda Wilcox, “The Italian Soldiers’ Experience in Libya, 1911-1912,” in The Wars Before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War, ed. William Mulligan, Dominik Geppert and Andreas Rose (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 41-58.
242 Detailed accounts of the systematic persecution of noncombatants and the efforts to assimilate enemy populations by the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian armies can be found in Chapters II and IV of the Carnegie Report.
landlords, Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian peasants organized insurgent groups which were responsible for devastating the Macedonian countryside and for massacring and expelling large numbers of civilians from their native lands. According to Brailsford, the practice of burning villages and exiling the defeated population was typical of all Balkan wars and insurrections.\textsuperscript{243} It was a long-established tradition which was influenced by Ottoman methods of warfare and perpetuated in local folklore. Balkan songs, poems and oral histories, which frequently featured scenes of rape, pillage and massacre, referred to extreme violence as a common occurrence during armed confrontations. Since the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire had endured centuries of injustice and reprisals at the hands of their masters, the natural impulse towards revenge unleashed a wave of unimaginable terror.\textsuperscript{244} Brailsford suggested that this phenomenon differed significantly from the military traditions which existed in Western Europe. Balkan warfare was influenced by Ottoman conceptions of justice and retribution. As a result of centuries of cultural isolation, the degree of violence and brutality which soldiers displayed had become incomparable to the rest of Europe.\textsuperscript{245} Since the Balkan Wars erupted as a form of revolt against former Ottoman oppressors, international standards of military conduct were disregarded and no effort was made to impose discipline upon the armies. Brailsford demonstrated that during the early weeks of the occupation, Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian authorities in Macedonia failed to restrain the local insurgent bands which committed atrocities against the Muslim population. In the absence of civil

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., 108.
administration, brigands, as well as regular soldiers, undertook a systematic policy of plunder, assassination and devastation.

According to the estimates of the British Macedonian Relief Fund, eighty per cent of the villages in the province of Monastir, which was occupied by Serbian and Greek troops, were burnt, forcing thousands of refugees to emigrate. In the district of Pravishta, Bulgarian bands took over the administration and organized the robbery and persecution of hundreds of Muslim peasants. The most severe atrocities took place in the Strumitsa and Kukush regions. Driven by “cupidity and race hatred,” Bulgarian and Serbian military leaders in Strumitsa collaborated with local insurgents in the assassination of several hundred Turks. While personal motives often determined the victims’ fate, the evidence suggests that the majority of the killings were indiscriminate. In the region of Kukush, which was occupied by the infamous Bulgarian guerrilla leader Donchev, Muslim women and children were massacred, while the men were shut in mosques and burnt alive. This information was confirmed by Greek and Serbian observers and by members of the French Catholic mission.

The clashes between the Greek and Bulgarian armies during the early weeks of the Second Balkan War most clearly illustrated the “racial hatreds” which divided the Balkan nationalities. According to Brailsford, the atrocities committed against Ottomans were easy to comprehend due to the history of the region, but the violence between former Christian allies was completely unjustifiable. Despite the similarities in culture and religion, Greeks and Bulgarians were sharply distinguished by differences in

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246 Ibid., 72.
247 Ibid., 73-75. These events took place during the First Balkan War. The region was later reoccupied by the Greek army.
temperament which have contributed to the traditional animosity between “the two races.” This phenomenon was particularly noticeable in Macedonia, since the Bulgarian population benefited from a “certain social cleavage.”

In Chapter II of the Carnegie Report, Brailsford investigated events in Doxato, Serres and Demir-Hissar where the Bulgarians allegedly committed some of the most despicable crimes. The Greek government and press accused the Bulgarian army of deliberately burning the cities and massacring their inhabitants. While the Carnegie Commission confirmed the Bulgarians’ responsibility for some of the atrocities, it also discovered that the Greek allegations were exaggerated and that most of the violence occurred as a form of retaliation to previous attacks.

Insurgent bands, which operated alongside the regular armies, took part in all of these incidents. In Doxato, Bulgarian reprisals were provoked by the local Greek inhabitants who organized a volunteer military force. Greek insurgents allegedly attacked a Bulgarian convoy and, in return, an infantry detachment composed of Pomaks entered the city and massacred hundreds of civilians.

Upon the retreat of the Bulgarian army from Serres and Demir Hissar, the civil administration and military command were taken over by citizen militias which were led by the local Greek bishops. According to Brailsford, the involvement of ecclesiastical authorities in the conflict testified to the political influence of the Orthodox Church in the Balkans.

In Serres, the bishop commanded the leaders of the local insurgent band to hunt down the Bulgarian population within the city and in the surrounding villages. The

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248 Ibid., 95.
249 Ibid., 94.
250 Ibid., 80.
251 Ibid., 81–83. According to Brailsford, the Pomaks showed loyalty to the Bulgarian army out of a desire for revenge against the Greeks who had terrorized them during the previous war.
252 Ibid., 93.
bandits pillaged the homes of civilians, violated women and detained the entire male population in the local Greek girls’ high school. Within several days, the gaolers tortured and killed up to two hundred and fifty prisoners and the building was thus quickly converted into a slaughterhouse. While some of the victims were identified as members of Bulgarian insurgent groups, the majority were peasants who were not directly involved in the conflict with the Greeks. On the other hand, the Bulgarian army was proven guilty of burning down the entire Greek quarter of Serres. However, the Commission demonstrated that this circumstance was accidental and that the fire spread quickly from a few incinerated buildings as a result of the heat and strong winds. In Demir-Hissar, the violence perpetrated by Greek insurgents provoked the retaliation of the Bulgarian army. The bishop, who became the leader of the local band, caused a major confrontation in the streets of the city by shooting at Bulgarian troops.

The Carnegie Commission argued that stigmatization and dehumanization of the enemy were common practices during the Balkan Wars. Atrocity propaganda played a key role in bringing the conflicts to the attention of the international public and in justifying the joint Greek and Serbian military offensive against Bulgaria in the summer of 1913. It was precisely King Constantine I’s dispatches to The New York Times from July 18 and 19 which prompted Nicholas Butler to appoint the Balkan Commission and investigate the controversy surrounding the reported crimes. During the Second Balkan War, the media cooperated with the governments of the belligerent nations in spreading

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253 Ibid., 87-89.
254 Ibid., 92.
255 Ibid., 93.
material which dehumanized and condemned the enemy. The purpose of this strategy was to win support for the military effort by manipulating the public’s fear of invasion and creating a false sense of impending danger. In the Carnegie Report, Brailsford analyzed the significance of Greek propaganda. In the summer of 1913, the press published articles which contained gruesome details of Bulgarian atrocities against Muslims in order to discredit Greece’s former ally. By emphasizing the cruelty and barbarity of the Bulgarians and depicting them as a “race of monsters,” the authors of these articles inspired Greek nationalism and successfully turned public opinion in favour of the war.

According to Brailsford, atrocity propaganda was especially effective due to the nature of Balkan temperament. The Greeks, an “excitable southern race which has been schooled in Balkan conceptions of vengeance,” were easily influenced by the information published in the media and joined the war against Bulgaria filled with “anger and contempt.” Since the general attitude of the population was to treat the enemy as “vermin,” the Greek army was prepared to commit atrocities which exceeded those from the previous conflict.257

According to Brailsford, Greek propaganda deliberately exaggerated and misrepresented information related to the actions of the Bulgarian government and military command. In the official statements which he released to the foreign press, King Constantine I rightfully accused the Bulgarians of initiating the Second Balkan War by violating the peace agreement between the allies, but he provided misleading information regarding the actions of the Bulgarian army. A dispatch to The New York Times from July 3 claims that, as early as May 20, Bulgarian troops attacked a Greek regiment in

Aughisma, a small village near Kavala. In the following days, the Bulgarians also seized several towns in the district of Panghaion which were located within Greek territory. By refusing to evacuate the neutral zone in the region of Salonica, the Commander in Chief of the Bulgarian army violated a military convention whose purpose was to prevent hostilities in the area. The occupation of strategically important towns was a clear sign that the Bulgarians were preparing for war against Greece and Serbia. This information contradicted subsequent statements by King Constantine I regarding the origins of the Second Balkan War. The Carnegie Report contains a copy of the King’s telegram from July 12 which provides details of the Bulgarian atrocities in Demir-Hissar. According to the document, the captain who was in charge the Sixth Division ordered the massacre of a hundred Greek notables from the town, including the archbishop and two priests. Bulgarian soldiers were also found guilty of violating young girls and assassinating those who resisted them. As King Constantine remarked, the outrages committed by these “barbarous hordes” exceeded all of the horrors which they perpetrated in the past. Therefore, the Greek government had no choice but to respond to the attack in order to protect its population.

Since the Carnegie Report makes no reference to the incident in Aughisma or the actions of the Bulgarian army in Salonica, it is difficult to determine the veracity of King Constantine I’s statements. However, the Commission revealed that some of the facts presented by the Greek government, particularly those related to the outbreak of hostilities, were exaggerated. It is, therefore, possible that the information submitted to the press in the early weeks of the Second Balkan War was fabricated. Brailsford argued

259 Ibid., 300.
that the Greek attack of the town of Kukush, which took place on July 4, initiated the conflict between the former allies. A comparison of dates shows that the event preceded the destruction of Demir-Hissar, Serres and Doxato. The arguments suggesting that the Greek invasion of Macedonia was provoked by the attacks of the Bulgarian army are thus automatically rejected.\textsuperscript{260} According to Brailsford, Kukush, whose population was predominantly Bulgarian, was transformed from a flourishing town into a “heap of ruins.” While most of the population fled before the arrival of the Greeks, seventy-four people, including women and young children, were massacred. Several hundred residents took shelter in the local French Catholic orphanage which remained intact due to its foreign status.\textsuperscript{261} The Greek army adopted the standard Balkan practice of pillaging and burning the town and the surrounding area. In some cases, the military command allowed Turkish irregulars to participate in the atrocities and even provided them with uniforms and weapons. The testimonies of several independent eyewitnesses, including representatives from the Catholic orphanage, confirm that the persecution of civilians was a systematic policy and that the events in Kukush were unprovoked.\textsuperscript{262}

In the streets of Salonica and Pireaus, the Carnegie Commission encountered two propaganda posters celebrating the recent victory of the Greek army in Kukush. The first image, entitled Bulgarophagos, or ‘Bulgar-eater,’ shows a Greek evzone who is holding a living Bulgarian soldier by the arms and gnawing at his face. The flames coming from burning houses and the heaps of corpses, which are displayed in the background, serve as a reminder of the shameful Bulgarian defeat. The second poster depicts a battlefield in

\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., 97. \\
\textsuperscript{261} Ibid., 99. \\
\textsuperscript{262} Ibid., 99-101.
which the victorious Greek army is driving out the conquered Bulgarians with rifles and bayonets. At the center of the image, a Greek soldier is gauging out the eyes of a dead Bulgarian whose lifeless body lies on the ground. In both cases, the eyes of the Greek soldiers are exaggerated and display anger and ferocity.263 As Brailsford suggests, the posters represented the general state of mind of the Greek army and serve as evidence of the deeply rooted animosity towards the enemy. The images make reference to the legend of the Byzantine Emperor Basil II who scored a decisive victory against the Bulgarian Tsar Samuel. Basil earned the nickname ‘Bulgar-Slayer’ after his army captured and blinded 15,000 of Samuel’s soldiers in the battle of Kleidon.264 The reproduction of this theme in Greek propaganda messages illustrates the magnitude of the “race hatred.”265 More importantly, however, the posters confirm that the Greek government deliberately misrepresented the information related to the conduct of the Bulgarian army during the Second Balkan War. In the dispatch to The New York Times from July 18, King Constantine claimed that the attack of Kukush was organized by the Bulgarians and that the eyes of two Greek soldiers were gauged out during the event.266 As the evidence presented by the Balkan Commission suggests, this statement was most likely fabricated in order to deceive public opinion and justify Greek military advances against Bulgaria.

The Carnegie Report suggests that the Bulgarian and Serbian armies were also guilty of dehumanizing and torturing captured enemies. During the occupation of

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263 The posters are available on p. 96 and p. 98 of the report.
266 The New York Times, “A Year of Slaughter and Rapine Directed Against Mussulman and Christian Alike,” July 18, 1913. King Constantine I was referring to an attack which allegedly took place during the Second Balkan War.
Adrianople, Bulgarian troops treated Turkish soldiers and civilians with extreme cruelty and inhumanity. While the city was still under siege by the invading army, the local population, which remained isolated from the outside world for two months, suffered from disease and starvation. The shortage of food and the lack of adequate medical aid resulted in a humanitarian crisis. Driven by despair, one man allegedly committed suicide after killing his entire family, while a Turkish woman drowned her starving children in the river. Several days prior to the entry of the Bulgarian army into the city, the mortality rate was estimated at fifty to sixty persons a day. These events were supported by a document entitled *Journal of the Siege of Adrianople* which, according to the Commission, was written by a well-known and trustworthy author.\(^{267}\) After the Bulgarian army took over Adrianople, it restored civil order and took measures against the local bandits who were pillaging Turkish homes. However, prisoners of war, who were detained on the island of Sarai Eski in the Toundja river, received harsh treatment from the Bulgarians. Without proper accommodation or food supplies, the captured soldiers were forced to strip the bark off trees and eat it. The condition of the prisoners was aggravated by the inclement weather conditions and the cholera epidemics which contributed to high mortality. While this information was confirmed by several eyewitnesses, some evidence suggests that the Bulgarian authorities distributed food to the prisoners in an attempt to ameliorate the situation.\(^{268}\)

\(^{267}\) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission*, 110. The Carnegie Commission refers to the *Journal*’s author as “P.C.,” but it does not mention his full name.\(^{268}\) In the depositions published in the appendix of the Carnegie Report, survivors claim that they were forced to eat tree bark in order to survive. However, the Bulgarian General Vasov argues that he allowed prisoners to use the bark as fuel and that food was available to them. Miliukov confirms that Bulgarian soldiers shared their food supplies with the Turkish. See: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission*, 112; 341-346.
The Bulgarians were also accused of mistreating sick and wounded soldiers. During the siege of Adrianople, a Turkish prisoner of war, who was too weak to march, was shot on the spot by the Bulgarian officer in charge.\textsuperscript{269} According to Miliukov, this was a standard practice of the Bulgarian army, but in some cases, it was carried out as a result of panic. The massacre of captured Turkish soldiers in the Bulgarian city of Stara Zagora was influenced by rumours announcing the arrival of the Turkish army. In a similar incident, Bulgarian officers ordered the assassination of twenty-two Turkish prisoners in Adrianople due to fear of retaliation. However, an eyewitness recalled that while he was detained, he became the victim of unprovoked violence. The authorities ordered the beating of a hundred and fifty-seven captured soldiers in Erikler and massacred those who were unable to walk after the incident.\textsuperscript{270} During the Second Balkan War, Serbian prisoners of war were also attacked by their Bulgarian captors. Although some combatants were reluctant to inflict violence on their former allies, the military leadership encouraged acts of cruelty in an effort to stir up the morale of the army.\textsuperscript{271} In the early weeks of the conflict, the Bulgarian General Savov instructed the commander of the Fourth army to attack the enemy “as energetically as possible” in order to inflict heavy blows and inspire the fierceness of the soldiers.\textsuperscript{272} This policy was evidently followed, since the conflict between Serbians and Bulgarians quickly escalated into a “savage war.” The evidence presented in the Carnegie Report suggests that the Bulgarians frequently tortured injured enemy soldiers and robbed them of their

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., 113.  
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid., 216.  
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid., 140.  
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., 68.
possessions. The Commission compiled a detailed list of gruesome atrocities, such as the mutilation of dead and living soldiers and the roasting of corpses on a spit.273

Due to the refusal of the Serbian government to communicate with the Carnegie Commission, the latter was unable to obtain official statements regarding the conduct of the army. However, eyewitness testimony supported the allegations that Serbian soldiers were guilty of acts of violence against prisoners of war. In an incident which took place shortly after the outbreak of the Second Balkan War, five Bulgarian officers were captured and massacred after their squadron refused to surrender to the Serbs. The event was witnessed by a Bulgarian doctor who was wounded, but managed to escape death during the enemy’s retreat. The Carnegie Report features a photograph of the murdered officers which shows that their boots and rifles have been plundered.274 Another Bulgarian officer, Demetrius Gheorgiev, recalls that soldiers who were wounded in the battle near the Zletovska river were assassinated by Serbian patrols. Although Gheorgiev was injured, he was able to find a hiding place which helped save his life. A Serbian ambulance rescued him in exchange for money and he finally received medical help at the local Russian mission.275 In addition to executing prisoners of war, the Serbian army was also responsible for persecuting civilians. Bulgarian peasants in several villages were forced to flee after their houses had been pillaged and burned by soldiers and bandits.276

According to the Report, another distinctive feature of the Balkan Wars was the practice of cultural assimilation. Although military commanders generally ordered the

273 Ibid., 141.
274 Ibid., 143-144.
275 Ibid., 145.
276 Ibid., 146-147.
extermination of civilians in recently conquered territories, in some cases, the state and the Church developed policies for eradicating the national consciousness of the enemy population. As the authors of the Carnegie Report pointed out, the forcible subjugation of various ethnic groups to foreign rule gave further evidence to the existence of “race hatreds” and exposed the illegitimacy of territorial claims. Miliukov and Brailsford investigated the Christianization of Bulgarian Pomaks during the First Balkan War. Although the official Bulgarian historiography maintains that during the Ottoman era, parts of the population were forced to accept the Muslim faith through violence, some evidence suggests that religious conversions were voluntary and that they were motivated by political and economic considerations.277 During the First Balkan War, Bulgarian authorities argued that the Pomaks must be reintroduced to Christianity in order to reverse the process of Islamization. According to Brailsford, this reasoning testified to the racial “degradation” which results from the Balkan tradition of vengeance.278 The evidence gathered by the Commission suggests that the converts were often rounded in large groups and forced to denounce their faith in the presence of both ecclesiastical and secular authorities. In addition to receiving baptismal names, they were also compelled to eat pork as a symbol of accepting Christian traditions.279

Bulgarian residents in Macedonia experienced a similar fate during the Second Balkan War. The Serbian administration in the province issued a military decree which increased the policing powers of the army, while it restricted the cultural and political freedom of the local population. According to Miliukov, the fact that innocent civilians

279 Ibid., 155-156.
were treated as “rebels in a perpetual state of revolt” demonstrated the inauthenticity of Serbian claims to ethnic and cultural belonging. If the population of Macedonia identified itself with the nationality of the invading army, the policies of repression and cultural assimilation would have been unnecessary. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, Bulgarian schoolmasters and religious leaders were subject to systematic persecution. The authorities arrested the archbishops of all six dioceses in the province and released them from duty under charges of organizing a revolt against the Serbian regime. Archbishop Boris of Ohrida was forced to sign a false declaration regarding his illicit political activities and, shortly afterwards, he was exiled to Bulgaria. Neophyte of Uskub was similarly accused of conspiring against the authorities and showing disrespect by not mentioning the name of the Serbian archbishop during mass. After spending several days under house arrest, Neophyte was forced to abandon his diocese. Despite the expulsion of Bulgarian bishops, the Serbian government had limited success at establishing cultural hegemony in Macedonia due to the strong religious affiliation of the local population.280

Miliukov suggests that bands of irregular soldiers cooperated with the Serbian authorities in the persecution of Bulgarians. In Uskub, members of the Black Hand insurgent organization formed a central committee of national defense whose purpose was to assist the government’s policy of ethnic assimilation through violence and intimidation. A building located near the Russian consulate in the city, which the locals referred to as “the Black House,” was converted into a makeshift prison where alleged political enemies and conspirators were detained and subject to torture. Victims of the Black Hand remained in isolation for extended periods and in some cases, they were

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280 Ibid., 165-168.
assassinated. According to Miliukov, these events took place with the knowledge of the
authorities. Individuals who complained about the disappearance of their neighbours were
ignored and, depending on their background, they sometimes received punishment. 281

The criminal activities of insurgents assumed an even more sinister character in the
Macedonian countryside. Under the pretext of searching for hidden firearms, the brigands
entered the homes of Bulgarian peasants and indulged in robbery. Eyewitnesses reported
that women and young girls were violated, while the priests were forced to pay ransom in
order to avoid expulsion. 282 In many towns and villages, which were predominantly
Bulgarian, the authorities gathered the entire population and forced it to denounce the
Exarchy and swear allegiance to the Serbian Orthodox Church and government. Those
who refused were beaten and sent to prison, while schoolmasters and ecclesiastical
authorities were removed from office and deported to Bulgaria. 283

The Bulgarian population in Greek Macedonia was also subject to forced
assimilation. While the methods of coercion were identical to those employed by the
Serbian government, the reprisals against foreign nationals were carried out with even
greater intensity and less “humanitarian sentiment.” Although the Greek government
announced its intention to respect the rights of all ethnic groups in the province, the
testimony of Bulgarian peasants, schoolmasters and bishops suggests that this policy was
widely disregarded. In the region of Castoria, peasants were forced to proclaim that they
were Greeks who had been compelled to denounce their nationality during the Bulgarian
occupation. In addition, the entire population of several villages was converted to the

281 Ibid., 169.
282 Ibid., 170.
283 Ibid., 173-186.
Greek Patriarchy, since Bulgarian Orthodoxy was declared an illegitimate religion. In some cases, the inhabitants received false identity documents which established their place of birth within Bulgaria. In this way, the government hoped to demonstrate that Macedonia was entirely Greek and that no other nationalities were native to the province.\textsuperscript{284} Arbitrary arrests, humiliation and expulsion of notable citizens occurred in many towns and villages. In Castoria and Vodéna, schoolmasters and priests were arrested and expelled, while Slavic inscriptions were systematically defaced from buildings. However, Miliukov argued that, similar to the Serbian authorities, the Greeks failed to assimilate the Bulgarian population due to the animosity between the two nations and the profound cultural and linguistic differences.\textsuperscript{285}

\textbf{The Aftermath of the Balkan Wars and the Prospects for Peace}

In the remaining chapters of the report, Miliukov, Godart and Dutton summarized the consequences from the conflicts and analyzed the prospects for the political and economic future of the Balkan states. In addition to the human and material losses, the Balkan Wars also resulted in severe “moral and social confusion” which impeded the progress of the entire region. The refusal to recognize the rights of different nationalities and the complete disregard for justice and humanity were the two most common manifestations of the “immaturity of national and civic character” which the Commission condemned. More importantly, however, the “extreme militarism” of the belligerents contributed to growing instability and threatened the establishment of peace.\textsuperscript{286} The

\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., 197-198.
\textsuperscript{285} Ibid., 198-200.
\textsuperscript{286} Ibid., 268-269; 272.
Carnegie Report contrasted the stereotype of the violent, barbaric Balkans with the image of a harmonious and united “civilized world.” Its authors suggested that the Great Powers had overcome the national jealousies and greed which resulted in the present conflict and that they were committed to the advancement of peace and cooperation. Due to their cultural and economic backwardness, the Balkan nations lacked the capacity to cultivate friendly international relations. During the two wars, the belligerents ignored the standards of international conduct which were established by the “civilized world.” As Miliukov pointed out, all of the Hague Conventions on the rules of international warfare were violated on multiple occasions. The evidence presented to the Commission suggests that, with the exception of Bulgaria, none of the Balkan armies received proper instructions on the laws and customs of war. Of all the crimes and atrocities described in the Report, the mistreatment of prisoners of war represented the grossest violation. In Greece, captured enemy soldiers were incarcerated and subject to reprisals, while the wounded were massacred despite being accommodated in military hospitals.

The economic conditions in the Balkans also served as an example of the lack of civilization. Since Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria were predominantly agrarian, the losses produced by the wars were not as severe as those which would have occurred in “great industrial states.” In the absence of male workers, women took over agricultural production and, as a result, foreign exports were not affected. In addition, the majority of the population, which resided in the countryside, maintained adequate food supplies

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287 Ibid., 208.
288 Ibid., 210. Greece and Serbia refused to share information with the Commission, while Bulgaria provided written evidence that the army was familiar with the 1907 Geneva Convention.
289 Ibid., 218; 228.
290 Ibid., 245.
while the hostilities took place. According to Godart, a conflict of a similar magnitude to
the Balkan Wars would have caused significant disruptions in foreign trade and industrial
production in the highly advanced economies of the civilized world.\textsuperscript{291} Therefore, he
argued that public opinion needs to be informed about the material losses and the deadly
statistics from the belligerent states.\textsuperscript{292} The thousands of dead and mutilated soldiers, the
annihilation of entire communities, the displacement of populations and the destruction of
infrastructure dispelled the popular misconception promoted by “false patriots” in Europe
and North America that countries could benefit from the war industry. As Godart
exclaimed sarcastically, only the makers of artificial limbs profited from the conflict in
the Balkans.\textsuperscript{293} The heavy military expenditures depleted the national treasuries of the
Balkan nations and increased their foreign debts, thereby reducing them to “beggars.”
The widespread poverty which resulted from the wars was yet another stumbling block to
the region’s progress toward civilization.\textsuperscript{294}

In addition to analyzing the legal and economic consequences from the Balkan
Wars, the Carnegie Commission also evaluated their moral and social significance.
According to Dutton, the atrocious events described in the earlier chapters of the report
represented “lapses in humanity” which could not escape the censure of the “civilized
world.”\textsuperscript{295} The long period of Ottoman rule was partly responsible for the extreme
violence of the belligerents. For several centuries, scenes of massacre, rape and pillage
were a daily occurrence in the Balkans and for that reason, human life was regarded as

\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., 246.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., 236.
\textsuperscript{293} Ibid., 243.
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid., 260-264.
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid., 268-269.
“cheap.” More importantly, however, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece had not established the laws and institutions which guaranteed the peace and stability of “older civilizations.” The militarism promoted by government leaders inspired ethnic hatred and legitimized acts of cruelty against foreign nationalities. According to Dutton, the Balkan Wars were the first conflicts in which armies received orders to massacre civilians. In addition, the Orthodox Church cooperated with the government in promoting chauvinism and aggression. Instead of focusing on the spiritual and moral guidance of their flocks, bishops and priests disseminated nationalist propaganda and organized violent campaigns of ethnic assimilation.296

The uncontrollable violence also created obstacles for the educational reform which was desperately needed in the Balkans. Despite the efforts of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria to promote learning by expanding the school systems, the majority of the population was still illiterate. Although some symbols of civilization, such as paved streets and sewage systems, were encountered in large cities, public hygiene and sanitation were nonexistent in the Balkan countryside. The ignorance of the peasant population and the general disregard for human comfort, which were chiefly responsible for this situation, could only be improved through rigorous education.297 This, however, was impossible due to the social chaos produced by the wars and the systematic repression of civil and religious authorities. According to Dutton, the persecution of Bulgarian bishops and schoolmasters in Macedonia had become the epitome of the “race hatred” in the Balkans. The failure of Greece and Serbia to guarantee peaceful coexistence between the different nationalities proved that they were incapable of

296 Ibid., 269-272.
297 Ibid., 270-271.
administering the province. Due to the uneven territorial distribution and the subjugation of indigenous populations to foreign rule, the Bucharest Treaty further sanctioned ethnic intolerance.298

The prospects for permanent peace in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars were thus bleak. Bulgaria felt unjustified by the loss of Dobrudzha and Macedonia, while Greece and Serbia had yet to consolidate their influence in the conquered territories.299 As representatives of the “civilized world,” the members of the Carnegie Commission expressed a paternalistic concern for the future of the Balkan states. Although the Great Powers were not directly responsible for the outbreak of the conflicts, they had a moral obligation to prevent their recurrence. The authors of the Report argued that in order to promote reconciliation, Europe and the United States must cease to exploit the belligerents for profit and set an example of friendly and peaceful cooperation.300 The Commission proposed an explanation for the present condition in the Balkans which was reminiscent of Norman Angell’s theory of the ‘Great Illusion.’ Due to their primitivism, “little countries,” like Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, fell prey to the manufacturers of weapons and the “jingo press” which supported the war industry. Contrary to the propaganda spread by these agents of “commercial patriotism,” the accumulation of armaments had put the Balkan governments in debt, while the recent wars had completely devastated their economies. Despite the heavy militarization of the Great Powers, public opinion in the “civilized world” rejected the conditions of the armed peace. Government leaders were “manifestly unwilling to make war” and refused to intervene in the current

298 Ibid., 268.
299 Ibid., 272.
300 Ibid., 273.
military crisis for the sake of preserving the international union established at the Hague. In fact, the Balkan Wars set a precedent in the diplomatic history of Europe by influencing a new policy of foreign relations based on pacifism and international cooperation.\footnote{Ibid., 16-18.}

Since the “civilized world” was free from foreign entanglements and jealousies, it had a duty to guide the Balkan nations towards reconciliation. As Dutton suggested, by encouraging Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria to sign arbitration treaties, the governments of Europe and the United States would successfully promote permanent peace.\footnote{Ibid., 273.} Due to their “superior wisdom,” the Great Powers also had the authority to judge and express moral indignation at the actions of the belligerents. Although they condemned the extreme violence and brutality of the combatants, the members of the Carnegie Commission made a sharp distinction between the ideas and objectives which inspired the First and Second Balkan Wars. The first conflict, or the “War of Liberation,” represented the protest of “the weak against the strong.” The victory of the oppressed nations against their conqueror was both heroic and patriotic and, therefore, it was unanimously praised and celebrated throughout the “civilized world.”\footnote{Ibid., 4.} Despite the “primitive” nature of the instincts and motives which influenced the outbreak of the First Balkan War, it was nevertheless a “just and holy cause,” since it promised to eradicate Ottoman rule from Europe and thus put an end to the Eastern Question. But the War of the Allies was tarnished by the barbaric crimes and atrocities which had long been rejected by “civilized warfare.” Among the regular armies and insurgent groups, there
were many combatants of “low, criminal and even bestial type” who ignored the standards of humanity in order to fulfill their desire for revenge.304

The belligerents received the most severe criticism for breaking the alliance and inaugurating the second round of hostilities. Unlike the lofty ideas and purposes which inspired the First Balkan War, the “fratricidal” conflict was influenced by greed for territorial expansion, mutual distrust and hatred. As the events described by the Carnegie Commission suggest, both the victor and the vanquished lose morally and materially from this type of warfare. The authors of the report felt that it was their duty to expose the actions of the belligerents to the scrutiny of the “civilized world” precisely because they were looking after the interests of these “small states.” According to d’Estournelles, each commissioner was devoted to the establishment of Balkan freedom and independence. A “true disciple of Lord Byron and of Gladstone,” Brailsford risked his own life by volunteering in the war for the liberation of Crete. As a political leader and historian, Miliukov demonstrated “perfect impartiality” towards all Balkan nations and defended their right to self-determination. Throughout his diplomatic career, d’Estournelles, who described himself as a passionate Philhellene, expressed “great sympathy” for the sufferings of Christians under Ottoman rule and promoted their struggle for emancipation. But in order to remain faithful to the spirit of justice which inspired the inquiry, these men of “rectitude” and “high moral integrity” felt obligated to condemn the Balkan massacres. The belligerents could end the conflict and achieve reconciliation only by accepting responsibility for their crimes. Therefore, as d’Estournelles pointed out, the leaders of the Carnegie Endowment deserved praise and admiration for their “generous

304 Ibid., 265.
initiative,” since it promised to eradicate the evil which impeded the establishment of permanent international peace.305

Conclusion

The arguments expressed in Carnegie Report thus serve as an illustration of the Balkanist discourse from the early twentieth century. The document confirms the belief that the Balkans were defined by extreme violence, absence of civil and legal institutions and complete disregard for “civilized” norms of international behaviour. The Commissioners were unanimous in their judgement of Balkan barbarity and showed little distinction in their treatment of the various nationalities involved in the conflict. The Report also demonstrated the Great Powers’ negative response to the “balkanization” of the former Ottoman provinces. The Balkan Wars disturbed the balance of power in South-East Europe and created the potential for a military conflict between Russia and Austria. According to the Commission, the tendency towards violence was a cultural trait which distinguished the Balkans from the “civilized world.” The struggle for political and religious hegemony between the different nationalities was fuelled by deeply rooted “race hatreds” and jealousies. The inability of the belligerents to overcome their differences in a peaceful manner was an obvious sign of their backwardness and cultural inferiority. Finally, the Report confirms the stereotype of the Balkans as a crossroad between barbarity and civilization. Despite the efforts of the Balkan governments to improve social conditions, the region lagged behind Europe and the United States in terms of industrial growth, social and political development.

305 Ibid., 2-7; 265.
According to the evidence presented in the Report, the methods of warfare which were employed by the Balkan nations were the most obvious sign of primitivism. Brigands and regular soldiers were driven by a desire for revenge and committed acts of cruelty which seemed unjustifiable to contemporary observers. The participation of irregular soldiers in the killings, the humiliation and stigmatization of the enemy and the widespread violence against civilians clearly illustrated the cultural gap between the Balkans and the “civilized world.” The military traditions which were established in Western Europe were based on patriotism. Historians have demonstrated that the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars led to the emergence of a new type of warfare which transformed soldiering into an honourable and desirable occupation. Unlike the “bandits” who fought in the Balkan Wars, the artisans and educated, middle-class men who volunteered in European armies observed military discipline and inspired the national consciousness of their compatriots through self-sacrifice.\textsuperscript{306} On the other hand, the Report is valuable as a historical document which illustrates the nature of modern warfare. Although the Commission interpreted the annihilation of civilian communities and the distribution of atrocity propaganda as evidence of Balkan backwardness, these practices were adopted by the European armies and governments in World War I. Therefore, the Balkan Wars were not a regression to primitive ways, but a harbinger of the conflicts which took place in Europe later in the twentieth century.

Conclusion

The chapters in this thesis demonstrate that the Carnegie Commission operated on a set of preconceived notions about Balkan violence and that the desire to establish permanent peace among the belligerents was motivated by political considerations. As chapter I shows, the tendency to interpret militarism as a sign of cultural and economic backwardness was influenced by Social Darwinism. A common trend in the works of late nineteenth-century natural philosophers and historians was to study society from an evolutionary perspective. According to Herbert Spencer, economically underdeveloped nations were on the lowest scale of human civilization. Due to the constant competition for material resources and territorial gains, they displayed militant characteristics which the highly advanced industrial societies had outgrown. The elitism inherent in this theory appealed to individuals with conservative Republican convictions like Nicholas Butler, Elihu Root and Andrew Carnegie. The principle of ‘survival of the fittest’ supported the existence of the capitalist system and affirmed the belief in traditional American values like individualism. More importantly, however, Social Darwinism also justified colonial expansion. Proponents of American imperialism, including the founders of the Carnegie Endowment, argued that due to its superior fitness, the Anglo-Saxon race had a special civilizing mission and was destined to expand throughout North America and beyond.

Social Darwinism also influenced the optimistic belief in the establishment of permanent international peace. Since all nations were slowly evolving from their militant tendencies, European and American sociologists predicted that in the future, the world would be organized in a peaceful federation under the leadership of the Great Powers. In
the United States, the arbitration movement acquired popularity because it was consistent with the policy of imperialism. Arbitration treaties were strategic for the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine, since they precluded the possibility of military confrontations and eliminated the necessity to sign formal alliances with any power. By promoting international law as a substitute for war, the United States could also export elements of its political culture overseas. The leaders of the peace movement envisioned the establishment of a permanent International Tribunal at the Hague which was organized according to the system of the United States Supreme Court and a League of Nations based on the American federative model. Early twentieth-century pacifists also believed that the “civilized” nations would voluntarily reject war because of its economic consequences. In his writings and addresses at Lake Mohonk, John Bates Clark argued that due to the globalization of the capitalist economies, military conflicts would cause major financial losses throughout the “civilized world.” Norman Angell’s theory of the ‘Great Illusion,’ which was popular among the authors of the Carnegie Report, similarly maintained that the enormous expenditures associated with war were incompatible with economic progress.

The history of the American peace movement also reflects the growing importance of public opinion as a force which controls social and political change. Elihu Root and James Brown Scott believed that arbitration would eventually become a universally accepted method for settling disputes because, throughout the “civilized world,” the public was vested with the authority to sanction the law. Just as individuals avoided crimes due to fear of social condemnation, governments would voluntarily abide to the decisions of the Hague Tribunal in order to avoid criticism and rejection by the
international community. Moreover, pacifists believed that the education of public opinion was essential for the prevention of war. In addition to publishing the proceedings from the conferences, the delegates at Lake Mohonk also developed an elaborate system for promoting their ideas among political leaders, large businesses, university students and professors. While most of the existing peace societies were involved in the distribution of antiwar propaganda, the Carnegie Endowment was the first organization which promoted scientific research into the causes and consequences of military conflicts. The structure of the Endowment and the character of its publications reflect the elitist attitude of one of its chief founders, Nicholas Murray Butler. According to Butler’s theory of the ‘International Mind,’ only a select group of highly educated individuals from among the civilized countries should be in charge of directing public opinion. Based on this concept, Butler organized the Carnegie Commission as an international group of scientific experts whose duty was to enlighten the public about the circumstances surrounding the Balkan Wars.

Chapter II demonstrates that the media was responsible for influencing foreign perceptions about the origins of the conflicts and the actions of the belligerents. The publications in The New York Times, which appeared during the summer of 1913, contained detailed descriptions of the atrocities perpetrated by the Bulgarian army and presented the justifications of the Greek and Serbian governments for initiating the military campaign against their former ally. In addition to exposing the Balkan horrors to the “civilized world,” the press reports are also indicative of the growing concern of the Great Powers for the outcome of the wars. Since the late nineteenth century, the Eastern Question represented the greatest threat to European peace. As a result of the tensions
resulting from the balance-of-power diplomacy, the strategic interests of all imperial nations were affected by the territorial changes in the Balkans. On the other hand, the character and composition of the Carnegie Commission also reflect the paternalistic attitude of the Great Powers towards the Balkan states. The inquiry was partly inspired by the belief that big, powerful nations have a duty to look after the interests of small, young countries, such as Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. Among the members of the Commission there were champions of Balkan freedom and independence like d’Estournelles, Miliukov and Brailsford. Although the authors of the Report condemned the actions of the belligerents, they supported the Balkan governments’ right to self-determination and emancipation from Ottoman rule.

Chapter II also discusses the strategic appointment of commission members. By bringing together representatives from the United States, France, Austria, Germany, Great Britain and Russia, Butler hoped to convey a sense of unity among the Great Powers. Despite the crisis in international relations, which was exacerbated by the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, the leaders of the Carnegie Endowment wanted to demonstrate that Europe was impartial to the existing conflict. However, the history of the Balkan Commission is suggestive of the conflicts which divided the imperial alliances on the eve of World War I. From the very beginning, the investigation of the Balkan atrocities, which was supposed to have a nonpartisan, scientific character, was politicized. With the exception of d’Estournelles, none of the members who were originally chosen by Butler were willing to join the Commission due to the potential diplomatic risks.

Austria and Germany, whose imperial interests conflicted with those of Russia, were especially reluctant to appoint representatives. In addition, Butler failed to predict the negative reaction of the Balkan governments to the presence of foreign investigators. The refusal of Greece and Serbia to provide the necessary evidence became a major obstacle to the collection of material for the Report.

Finally, chapter III describes the reaction of the “civilized world” to the Balkan atrocities. The Carnegie Report demonstrates that the extreme violence of the belligerents is a sign of their primitivism. The “racial hatreds,” which led to the outbreak of the wars, had been outgrown by the imperial nations. The ancient tradition of vengeance influenced methods of warfare which had no equivalent throughout the “civilized world.” As the conflicts intensified, the army, the state, the Church and the noncombatant population all took part in the massacres, thereby diminishing the boundary between the military and the civilian zones. In fact, the Commission maintains that some of the most severe crimes were committed by irregular armies, while civilians suffered the heaviest consequences from the wars. Both Christians and Muslims were subject to massacres, expulsion and cultural and religious assimilation. As the Commission suggests, the persecution of noncombatants most clearly illustrates the intensity of the “racial hatreds.” The lack of civilization in the Balkans is also confirmed by the primitive economic conditions, the widespread poverty, the ignorance and illiteracy of the population. Overall, the losses inflicted from the conflicts prove the theory of Norman Angell that neither the victors nor the vanquished profit from war and serve as an important lesson to the Great Powers.
At the same time, the Carnegie Report also creates a counter-image of the “civilized world.” The militarism and backwardness of the Balkan states represents a sharp contrast to the cultural and material progress of Europe and the United States. Since the Great Powers are aware of their mutual economic interests, they are committed to the preservation of international peace. The codification of international law and the union established at The Hague are only part of the efforts to promote peaceful diplomatic relations. As the Commission suggests, the Balkan Wars have strengthened the friendship between the European nations and led to increased international cooperation for the purpose of avoiding an armed confrontation. The chapter of the Report related to the history of the Balkan Wars suggests the Austria and Russia are partly responsible for the military crisis as a result of their imperialism. In addition, the war industry takes advantage of the Balkan naïveté and creates opportunity for the growth of militarism. Although the Report criticizes the actions of the Great Powers, it never questions their right to establish political hegemony in the former Ottoman provinces. Due to their cultural and economic superiority, Europe and the United States also have the authority to restrain Balkan violence and condemn the actions of the belligerents.

In terms of the overall success of the Carnegie Report, Butler’s expectations were never fully met. Two main factors prevented the collection of impartial evidence. Like the majority of war correspondents before World War I, the members of the Commission did not witness the events which they reported. Since they toured the Balkans after the hostilities had already ended, the investigators were only able to judge the magnitude of the wars based on their consequences. Although the death toll, the destruction of property and the expulsion of civilians were obvious signs of the social and economic crisis, the
commissioners’ ability to reconstruct events from the conflicts was limited. They relied on information from eyewitnesses whose impartiality was not guaranteed. For example, peasants who suffered at the hands of soldiers and bandits could have easily exaggerated the atrocities in order to discredit the enemy. Similarly, military officials may have intentionally misrepresented information regarding the conduct of their armies in an effort to minimize their guilt. The Commission also did not question the testimony of foreign witnesses and automatically accepted it as truthful.

The refusal of Serbia and Greece to acknowledge the Commission was another limiting circumstance. Since the Carnegie Endowment was a young organization whose activities were largely unfamiliar in the Balkans, the purpose of the investigation was difficult to define. Although the commissioners were not political representatives, the Balkan governments interpreted their presence as unjustified interference on behalf of the Great Powers. However, it is important to remember that during the wars, the Balkan governments were generally suspicious of any foreign correspondents that visited the region. Due to strict censorship, journalists from Great Britain, Ireland and Germany were forced to remain within the Balkan capitals and were unable to obtain first-hand evidence. As a result, their ability to provide truthful accounts of the wars was severely limited. The treatment which the Carnegie Commission received was thus not exceptional. In fact, Brailsford, Miliukov, Dutton and Godart may have been more successful than most of their contemporaries, since they acquired evidence from all of the belligerents despite the limitations. Through the efforts of the Bulgarian government, the

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308 Ibid., 345-349.
Commission was able to examine the authentic letters of captured Greek soldiers which confirmed rumours about the massacre of civilians during the Second Balkan War.\textsuperscript{309}

Due to a significant delay in publication, the Carnegie Report failed to make the anticipated impact on international public opinion. Originally, Butler planned a simultaneous release of the English and French editions in late November, 1913. However, none of the commission members was able to meet the original deadline. Dutton submitted his chapter on November 18, while Brailsford’s contribution arrived at the Washington Office on December 8.\textsuperscript{310} Part of Miliukov’s manuscript, which was written in French, as well as Godart’s chapter, were received in Paris on November 25, but they were pending translation and editing.\textsuperscript{311} Since it appeared unlikely that the report would be complete by the end of the year, Butler suggested that the publication date be rescheduled for mid to late January. In this way, the authors would have sufficient time to finish their work and the Endowment would avoid the holiday season which was considered an unfavourable time for the printing of war-related material.\textsuperscript{312} But, as a result of unforeseen circumstances, Butler’s plans for a timely release of the Carnegie Report never came to fruition. Miliukov, who was supposed to write the greatest portion of the document, experienced some personal difficulties which drew his attention away from the project. In the summer of 1913, his brother Alexei died from an illness. In

addition, his membership in the Fourth Duma kept him preoccupied with Russian political affairs.313

Since the preparation of the Carnegie Report was organized collectively, Miliukov’s delay had an impact on the work of the entire Commission. Brailsford, whose duty was to translate the French chapters into English, was only able to send small portions of the document for print. By December 6, the Washington Office had only obtained a full copy of Chapter I.314 At the beginning of January, Miliukov announced his plan to submit the entire manuscript by the end of the month. Upon receiving this information, d’Estournelles scheduled a meeting in Paris for the purpose of revising the work of the commissioners, as well as agreeing on uniform spelling of proper and geographical names.315 However, as a result of Miliukov’s procrastination, the translation and the editing process were delayed significantly. The Paris meeting, which was originally supposed to take place on January 26, was postponed twice and the commissioners were unable to convene until February 14.316 Based on the letters collected in the archives, it appears that the directors of the Carnegie Endowment became increasingly frustrated with Miliukov. Butler interpreted the commissioner’s attitude as a sign of selfishness, arguing that he was more concerned with the impression which his writing would produce, rather than the “general interest” of the cause he was serving. Butler even suggested to d’Estournelles that if the delay continued, the Carnegie Report

313 Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 288; Riha, A Russian European, 208-213.
should be published without Miliukov’s contribution, so that public interest in the Balkan Wars would not be sacrificed.  

Meanwhile, Miliukov was required to temporarily abandon his political engagements at the Duma. He spent six weeks in solitude at his dacha in Finland in order to finish the rest of the chapters. The total length of the manuscript, which he completed in the winter of 1914, was one hundred and fifty pages, or two-thirds of the entire Report. After a substantial delay, the remainder of the Report finally arrived in Paris on January 27. D’Estournelles’ secretary, Prudhommeaux, commented that although Miliukov’s tremendous effort deserved praise and admiration, the manuscript would require significant revision before it could be printed. The chapters exceeded the length which the commissioners had previously discussed and they also contained major grammatical and stylistic errors due to the author’s poor command of French. More importantly, however, Miliukov’s contribution was pro-Bulgarian and risked offending the Greek and Serbian governments which were already ill-disposed towards the investigation. This issue was carefully discussed by the members of the Commission who were responsible for the editing and translation. Brailsford and Hirst suggested that, since Miliukov’s “personal preferences” were far too obvious, the chapter devoted to the history of the Balkan Wars should be published as an introduction which carried the author’s signature in order to distinguish his opinion from the rest of the Commission. After some deliberation, this idea was abandoned because the spirit of unity would be

destroyed and it would appear as if the commissioners were giving in to their critics. The collective authorship of the report was preserved, but Miliukov agreed that some corrections would be necessary to alleviate the suspicions about partiality.\textsuperscript{321}

Once Miliukov’s manuscript was submitted, Butler seemed satisfied with the progress of the Report. He dismissed the accusations against its authors, arguing that it was unrealistic to expect that the document would appeal to all of the belligerents. As long as the events described in it were truthful, the Commission had fulfilled its duty.\textsuperscript{322} D’Estournelles was equally pleased with the final draft of the Report. He argued that despite the delay, the publication would attract plenty of attention due to its irrefutable contents. D’Estournelles also wrote letters to Miliukov and Brailsford in which he expressed sincere gratitude for their contributions and praised their impartiality, honesty and devotion.\textsuperscript{323} The predictions of Butler and d’Estournelles regarding the mixed reactions to the Carnegie Report were correct. The Greek government and members of the Greek diaspora in the United States denounced the document, claiming that it deliberately misrepresented information about the Balkan Wars, while Bulgaria felt justified by the arguments expressed in it. Shortly before the publication of the English edition of the Report, the Greek \textit{charge d’affaires} in Washington, Alexander Vouros, released several statements in the press in which he attacked the Carnegie Commission. Vouros argued that the Report represented an attempt to “whitewash” Bulgaria, while Greece and Serbia were wrongly accused of crimes which they did not commit. Although the commissioners claimed that they served the interests of justice and truth, they were

nothing but men who “pretend to be historians, [and] have made a history that is misleading and farcical.”

Vouros further maintained that the Carnegie Commission was serving the interests of Bulgarian propaganda. There was no substantial evidence to support the argument that the destruction of Serres, Demir-Hissar and Doxato was influenced by Greek atrocities. The provocations, which allegedly led to the burning of Greek cities, were “imaginary” and represented a “grave injustice” to the Greek nation. It was a standard policy of the Bulgarian army to burn towns and villages in Macedonia upon retreat. Thus, the Bulgarians were responsible for the destruction of Kukush after the Greeks captured the city. The charges against the Bulgarians were confirmed by impartial foreign observers, such as war correspondents, physicians and photographers, and were universally accepted by the European governments. The Report ignored the opinion of major political figures like Sir Edward Grey for the sake of exonerating Bulgarian crimes. Vouros’ arguments were supported by Doctor John Constans, member of the Medical Faculty at Georgetown University. He claimed that the false accusations of the Carnegie Commission would renew the conflict between the Balkan nations. In an interview for The New York Times, Butler defended the impartiality of the Report. He suggested that although the Greeks “behaved the worst,” all of the belligerents were proven guilty of violating the rules of international warfare. Due to the recent bomb threats against the Bulgarian Queen by Greek nationals, Butler also expressed hopes that

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Her Majesty would cancel the scheduled trip to the United States in order to avoid transferring the “Balkan animosities” to Broadway.\(^{327}\)

In addition to the accusations in the press, the University of Athens released a report entitled *The Crimes of Bulgaria in Macedonia*. Based on the authority of foreign correspondents, consuls and missionaries, this anonymously written document presents contrary evidence to the facts established by the Balkan Commission. The publication is identical to the pamphlet *Atrocités Bulgares* which is referenced in the Carnegie Report as an unreliable source of information. There are a number of discrepancies between the testimony collected by the Commission and the arguments of the Greek authorities. For example, *Atrocités Bulgares* claims that during the destruction of Serres, four Greek notables, including Mr. Ghiné, the director of Orient Bank, were massacred.\(^{328}\) During the Commission’s tour of the city, Mr. Ghiné was “alive, well and unharmed” and entertained the visitors at his residence.\(^{329}\) Another inconsistency concerns the fate of the four Greek bishops who were allegedly killed by the Bulgarians.\(^{330}\) While the Carnegie Report confirmed that the bishop of Demir-Hissar was indeed shot during a battle, the rest of the supposed victims were “vigorous and apparently alive.”\(^{331}\) After the Commission had established this fact, the Greek authorities made corrections to the dispatches of King Constantine. Whereas in his original statement the King claimed that the bishops were “slaughtered,” the counter-report stated that they were simply “taken


\(^{330}\) King Constantine made this statement in his dispatch to the press. See: *The New York Times*, “A Year of Slaughter and Rapine Directed Against Mussulman and Christian Alike,” July 18, 1913.

The document also misrepresented the testimony of Father Gustave Michel regarding the massacre of Greek civilians in Kukush. As the statement, which is published in the Carnegie Report, suggests, the victims had been killed by Bulgarian bandits, rather than regular soldiers.

By contrast, Bulgarian government leaders and intellectuals responded favourably to the results from the Balkan inquiry. The general feeling in the country was that the Carnegie Report threw light upon the controversy surrounding the Balkan Wars and exonerated the Bulgarian army and government from the crimes which the foreign press ascribed to them. Long before the official release of the Report, representatives from the cultural and political life expressed great interest in the forthcoming publication. In the summer of 1913, Herbert Bridgman, editor of The Standard Union, forwarded to the Endowment’s office the letters of two prominent Bulgarians, Professor Constantine Stephanov and the scholar and politician Peter Matheeff. Based on the contents of the correspondence, it is evident that the authors were hoping to solicit support for refugees and promote the popularization of the “Bulgarian cause” overseas. Both men discussed at length the reasons for the policy of the Bulgarian government during the wars and expressed concern about the humanitarian crisis in the country. Butler seems to have interpreted the veiled requests for help as a sign of friendly disposition towards the work of the Endowment and inquired whether Matheeff would be willing to assist in the

333 Ibid., 12-14.
distribution of the Carnegie Report in Bulgaria. Matheeff, who was very enthusiastic about the request, compiled a detailed list with the names and addresses of institutions and people who were interested in obtaining a copy of the Report. Among them were current and former ministers and plenipotentiaries, the King and Queen of Bulgaria, The University of Sofia, the National Library, prominent lawyers, bankers, professors and intellectuals, including the famous writer Ivan Vazov. In addition, Matheeff sent a formal letter of gratitude to the Carnegie Endowment which was signed by thirty-one leaders of major educational institutions.

The English edition of the Carnegie Report was released in early July of 1914, just three weeks prior to the outbreak of World War I, and, as Butler feared, it failed to attract the interest of the “civilized world.” As the attention of international media became increasingly preoccupied with the conflict between the Great Powers, the memory of the Balkan Wars faded. Apart from the several editorial comments and the requests for distribution and translation, the Report received scant acknowledgement. But the delay in publication is only partly responsible for the failure of the Balkan Commission to make an impact on public opinion. A far more significant reason is that the ideas expressed in the Report were obsolete. The causes which led to the Balkan crisis, and which also contributed to the outbreak of the Great War, were much more complex than the supposed cultural inferiority of the belligerents. Although the Commission interpreted the Balkan atrocities as a sign of primitivism, they actually reflected the changing nature of European warfare. Historians have observed that, in

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337 CEIP archives, Vol. 121, “Herbert Bridgman to Nicholas Butler,” January 28, 1914; “To the Honourable Nicholas Murray Butler,” February 1, 1914. Both letters were sent to the Endowment through Bridgman.
terms of the experiences of soldiers and civilians, as well as the goals and aspirations of
the governments, the Balkan Wars represent a prelude to World War I. Trench warfare,
the use of machinery and the importance of nationalist ideology are only some of the
features which show the continuity between the two conflicts. As the Carnegie Report
demonstrates, modern warfare was no longer restricted to the armies and encompassed
the entire population of the belligerent states. The systematic persecution of civilians,
which began during the Italian-Ottoman and Balkan Wars, was also practiced by
European soldiers in the global conflicts of 1914 and 1945.

The Report is also significant because it confirms the stereotype of the Balkans as
a violent and dangerous region which has the potential of disturbing the peace between
the Great Powers. Since South-East Europe was at the epicentre of European imperial
rivalry in the early twentieth century, historians have frequently traced the origins of
World War I to the Balkans. This tendency became especially pronounced after the fall of
the Berlin Wall and the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s. These events
precipitated a shift in the historiographical perspective and eliminated the emphasis
which had hitherto been placed on Germany’s responsibility. Balkan nationalism and,
more specifically, the territorial aspirations of Serbia, have been analyzed as some of the
main causes of World War I. In her study of the conflict’s origins, historian Margaret
MacMillan has devoted considerable attention to the events in the Balkans, including the
Bosnian crisis of 1908, the Balkan Wars, and the assassination in Sarajevo. Similarly,
Christopher Clark has highlighted the conflict between the plans for Serbian expansion

339 Dominik Geppert, William Mulligan and Andreas Rose, “Introduction,” in The Wars before the Great
War, ed. Geppert, Mulligan and Rose, 5-9.
and the imperialism of Austria-Hungary. He traces the road to Sarajevo to 1903 when the Obrenović dynasty, which was supported by the rulers in Vienna, was succeeded by the pro-Russian Karadjordjević.\textsuperscript{341} Some scholars have recognized that this Eurocentric point of view ignores other significant events which occurred between 1910 and 1912, such as the Mexican and the Chinese revolutions, the negotiations at the British Imperial Conference and the election of Woodrow Wilson as President of the United States. However, since the conflicts in the Balkans were decisive for the transformation of the international order, historians have over-emphasized their significance.\textsuperscript{342}

The work of the Carnegie Commission also reflects the necessity to establish Western dominance in the Balkans and contain the aggression of the belligerents. In 1993, following the outbreak of the Yugoslav War, the Endowment published a second edition of the Report with an introduction by the American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan. Kennan presents the current military crisis as a major problem which the “civilized world” has to solve. Recent events have shown that, over the past eighty years, the Balkans have not experienced any cultural or political development. The “racial hatreds,” which led to the outbreak of the wars in 1912, are still relevant in the late twentieth century. The policy of ethnic assimilation and the willingness of government leaders to sanction atrocities perpetrated by local “chieftains” show the continuity between the two conflicts. The extreme nationalism of the belligerents and the desire to inflict revenge upon racial and religious enemies confirm the validity of the arguments expressed in the earlier report. The Balkans of 1993 are still widely separated from

\textsuperscript{341} Christopher Clark, \textit{The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914} (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 3-65.  
European civilization. After centuries of Ottoman rule and several decades of Soviet influence, the belligerents have acquired “non-European” characteristics, such as the refusal to conform to “civilized” standards of international conduct. The failure to guarantee the sovereignty of the Balkan nations could threaten the peace of Europe. Therefore, it is once again the duty of the West to interfere, be it diplomatically or militarily, in order to promote stability and order.\textsuperscript{343}

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